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Criminal responsibility is individual. Even when persons are
alleged to have committed a crime together, individuals - not
groups - are arrested, charged, convicted, and sentenced. We
have departed from this principle only rarely. Vicarious criminal
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liability is infrequent, ordinarily subject to only minor punishment, and clearly regulatory .1 Under the law of parties, one can
be held responsible for another's offense, but only upon a showing
of purposeful assistance in the crime. 2 Even under expansive
views of the responsibility of criminal conspirators, vicarious liability requires that an individual join a group and that another
member of the group commit a crime in furtherance of the conspiracy's objectives. 3
While the substantive criminal law scrupulously honors the
principle of individual responsibility, that principle is jeopardized in a joint trial of two or more defendants. Statutes or decisions in virtually all American jurisdictions permit joinder of defendants charged with the same offense, with different offenses
committed in furtherance of a common conspiracy, or with different offenses arising out of the same transaction, episode, or series
of transactions or episodes. 4 Rule 8(b) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure typifies American joinder provisions:
Two or more defendants may be charged in the same indictment or information if they are alleged to have participated in the
same act or transaction or in the same series of acts or transactions
constituting an offense or offenses. Such defendants may be
charged in one or more counts together or separately and all of the
defendants need not be charged in each count. 5

The prosecutor usually joins defendants by charging more than
one actor in the same indictment, information, or complaint.
Even when the prosecutor names the defendants in separate
charging instruments, the trial judge may ordinarily consolidate
the cases if the defendants could have been named in the same
charging instrument. 6
After joinder, separation is possible; 7 for example, Rule 14 of
1. See W. LAFAVE & A. ScO'l'l', HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 223-28 (1972) [hereinafter
cited as LAFAVE].
2. See ·id. at 502-12.
3. See Pinkerton v. United States, 328 U.S. 640 (1946). This expansive view has been
criticized. See LAFAVE, supra note 1, at 513-15.
4. The statutes and rules of court concerning joinder, consolidation, and severance
are collected in ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRU,!INAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS
RELATING TO JoINDER AND SEVERANCE app. A (Approved Draft, 1968).
5. FED. R. CRIM. P. 8(b).
6. See note 4 supra. FED. R. CRIM. P. 13 provides:
The court may order two or more indictments or informations or both to be tried
together if the offenses, and the defendants if there is more than one, could have
been joined in a single indictment or information. This procedure shall be the same
as if the prosecution were under such single indictment or information.
7. See note 4 supra.
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the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides in part:
If it appears that a defendant or the government is prejudiced
by a joinder . . . of defendants in an indictment or information or
by such joinder for trial together, the court may . . . grant a severance of defendants or provide whatever other relief justice requires. 8

In practice, however, trial courts order separate trials only upon

a showing of substantial prejudice to the defendant, and appellate courts reverse a denial of severance only for abuse of discretion. The law has, in effect, created a strong presumption that
defendants joined together should be tried together. 9
This Article questions that presumption. Legislatures and
courts, in weighing the relative advantages of joint and separate
trials, have unreasonably struck a balance in favor of joint trials.
The strongest justification traditionally offered for joint trials is
efficiency. This Article shows that courts have greatly exaggerated the supposed efficiencies of joint trials while grossly underestimating the impediments joint trials pose to fair and accurate
determinations of individual guilt or innocence. The propriety of
joint trials is more than a question of efficiencies. Joint trials
usually, although not always, help the prosecutor to get convictions, and thereby modify the balance of advantage in criminal
trials. 10 Disputes over joinder and severance should go beyond
issues of procedural efficiency to consider the wisdom of such a
modification. In considering questions of severance courts must
value the impediments to fairness imposed by joint trials, both
the general dangers inherent in complex litigation and the unique
prejudices that flow from joinder. They must weigh these impediments, case by case, against a realistic assessment of the benefits
of joinder. Such a balancing should replace the present blind
preference for joint trials and the correlative barriers to severance.

l.

THE EFFICIENCIES AND OTHER BENEFITS OF JOINT TRIALS

Courts and legislatures have rarely questioned their preference for joint trials whenever several defendants are charged with
related crimes. Frequently, courts simply assume the defendants
charged together should be tried together in the absence of a
8. FED. R. CRIM. P. 14.
9. See, e.g., 1 C. WRIGHT, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE: CRIMINAL 441-47 (1969).
10. Appellate courts acknowledge this by asserting that a better opportunity for an
acquittai in a separate triafis not a ground.for severance. "Id. at 443-44.
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compelling reason for severance. 11 Courts that bother to give reasons usually point to the efficiencies of joint trials, occasionally
suggesting other justifications to buttress their reliance on efficiency.12 But a careful analysis of the alleged advantages of joint
trials reveals that they are nonexistent or, at the least, grossly
exaggerated. 13
A.
1.

The Efficiency Justification
The Supposed Efficiencies

Justice White, dissenting in Bruton v. United States, 14 invoked the conventional wisdom that "[u]nquestionably, joint
trials are more economical and minimize the burden on witnesses, prosecutors, and courts. They also avoid delays in bring11. See, e.g., Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394
U.S. 1004 (1969), upholding the district court's decision refusing to grant severance:
Joint trials of persons charged together with committing the same offense or
with being accessory to its commission are the rule, rather· than the exception.
There is a substantial public interest in this procedure. It expedites the administration of justice, reduces the congestion of trial dockets, conserves judicial time,
lessens the burden upon citizens who must sacrifice both time and money to serve
upon juries, and avoids the necessity of recalling witnesses who would otherwise be
called upon to testify only once.
404 F.2d at 1196. See also Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983
(1973).
12. See text at notes 43-70 infra. If joint trials were always more efficient than separate ones and if joint trials provided other substantial benefits, then severance would be
rare. Severance would also be rare if one viewed the asserted prejudices to joined defendants as imaginary or justly deserved. Concerning the last point, consider the court's
remarks in Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S.
1004 (1969). In response to defendant's contention that he was prejudiced because his
codefendants testified while he did not and their counsel commented upon the fact that
the testifying defendants "hid nothing" from the jury, the Ninth Circuit said, "When men
get together to rob a bank, and do so, they take chances, one of which is that if they are
caught there may no longer be honor among thieves." 404 F.2d at 1197.
13. Of course, joinder of defendants deals with only a small segment of the criminal
justice process - the trial. There is no reason why defendants charged together or whose
cases are consolidated cannot jointly defend in a preliminary hearing where the issue is
whether there is probable cause to believe each guilty. See FED. R. CruM. P. 5.1. There is
also no reason why pretrial hearings dealing with motions for discovery, motions to suppress evidence, and challenges to the sufficiency of the charging instrument cannot be
conducted jointly. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 12. Indeed, the Federal Rules contemplate joint
pretrial hearings. Rule 12(b) provides in part that "[t]he following must be raised prior
to trial: •.• (5) Requests for a severance of . . . defendants under Rule 14."
14. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton the Court overruled Delli Paoli v. United States,
352 U.S. 232 (1957), and held that admitting into evidence a codefendant's confession that
implicated the defendant violated the defendant's rights of confrontation under the sixth
amendment. Bruton's implications for separate trials are examined later. See text at notes
127-75 infra.
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ing those accused of crime to trial." 15 While joint trials may be
more efficient than individual trials in some cases, Justice
White's assumptions raise several questions: How much more
efficient? 16 In what kinds of cases? How much additional burden
would individual trials place upon witnesses? Should it make a
difference who the witnesses are? How much delay would result
from individual trials or would there be delay at all in many
cases? The answers to these questions suggest several reasons for
doubting whether a joint trial is more efficient in the typical case
than separate trials.
One supposed efficiency of joinder is a saving of the prosecutor's time because of the substantial overlap of evidence against
the different defendants. But whether the trial is joint or individual affects only a small portion of the prosecutor's investment of
time. It does not affect police investigation, which is usually completed before the prosecutor decides on charging and joinder. 17 It
should not affect plea bargaining - it is no more efficient for the
prosecutor to plea bargain in a joined case than in one that has
been severed. Although the threat of a joint trial may tilt the
balance of advantage in plea bargaining toward the prosecutor,
it may make actual agreement less likely. 18 It need not affect
pretrial hearings, which may be held jointly, even when the trials
are separate. 18 It probably does not even make a substantial difference in the time the prosecutor spends preparing for trial.
Whether trials are joint or separate, the prosecutor must review
the evidentiary file and interview the witnesses. If separate trials
15. 391 U.S. at 143. Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Bruton, also assumed°
that joint trials promote efficiency: "Joint trials do conserve state funds, diminish inconvenience to witnesses and public authorities, and avoid delays in bringing those accused
of crime to trial." 391 U.S. at 134.
16. Some courts seem to assume that the savings follow a mathematical formula: a
joint trial of two defendants is twice as efficient as separate trials, a joint trial of three
defendants is three times as efficient, etc. See note 151 infra.
17. W. LAFAVE, AlmEsT 305 (1965) ("In most cases the investigation is concluded by
the time the prosecutor's office becomes involved.")
18. Some prosecutors take an "all-or-none" position in plea bargaining with joined
defendants and insist that each defendant accept the plea offer and plead guilty or none
may do so. See, e.g., Seaton v. State, 472 S.W.2d 905 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1971). The
requirement of persuading each defendant to agree to a disposition of his case before the
date set for the joint trial may mean that the case will be tried before a jury rather than
disposed of by guilty pleas. If only one defendant resists the temptation to plea bargain,
the others cannot plea bargain either. If the cases were severed and the others pied guilty,
the resisting defendant, facing trial alone, might at the eleventh hour eagerly accept the
government's offer. This is particularly likely if one or more of the plea agreements includes a promise to testify against any defendant holding out for a jury trial.
19. See note 13 supra.
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are held, the prosecutor must review the file again, but would
surely not need as much time as he would to prepare a new case.
A second presumed efficiency of joint trials is that they are
more convenient for witnesses. In fact, however, the effect of joint
trials on witnesses varies greatly from case to case and depends
in part on whether the witness is a civilian or a professional. To
involve lay witnesses in the prosecution of a case certainly forces
real burdens upon them. They must leave work or home to testify,
and an important witness may be required to remain at the courthouse throughout the trial. 20 If the witness is a child or the victim
of an alleged sex offense, we do not want him to repeat the trauma
of testifying without excellent reasons. 21 Most witnesses in criminal trials, however, are not civilians but professionals. The burden of presenting witnesses lies upon the government, whose witnesses are usually police officers, laboratory employees, prosecu20. Parker v. United States, 404 F.2d 1193 (9th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 1004
(1969):
The witness is the forgotten man in the administration of justice. His knowledge of the case may be purely fortuitous. Yet he can be compelled to attend,
subject to heavy penalties for his failure to do so. The remuneration for loss of his
time and for the inconvenience that he suffers is a mere pittance.•.• When he
gets to court, he may wait a long time before he is called. In a criminal case he will
probably be excluded from the courtroom and have to spend his time in a witness
room, which may or may not even have windows, or, worse yet, in the corridor of
the courthouse. He dare not talk to strangers or other witnesses; yet he is subject
to being interviewed and re-interviewed by counsel for both sides. When called, he
finds himself in a strange and often terrifying environment. . • . When he finishes,
he may or may not be excused, depending upon whether some counsel thinks that
he might want to recall him. Add to this merciless treatment. given by the news
media to all participants, including witnesses, in a trial of any notoriety, and the
attempts of-influence or the threats against his personal safety and that of his loved
ones to which a witness is sometimes subjected, and it is no wonder that most
citizens will do everything possible to avoid being called to testify. In a particular
case, once ought to be enough.
404 F.2d at 1196 n.4.
21. In State v. Druke, 115 Ariz. 224, 564 P.2d 913 (Ct. App. 1977), the state sought
mandamus to compel the trial judge to vacate his order severing the cases of two defendants charged with kidnapping and rape. The appellate court ordered the relief sought,
commenting, "We are of the opinion that the factors of judicial economy and the inconvenience to witnesses, particularly the victim, if separate trials are required, outweigh the
'potential for prejudice' urged by [the defendant]." 115 Ariz. at 227, 564 P.2d at 916,
One should distinguish the inconvenience of requiring a civilian witness to testify in
more than one trial arising from the same episode and the stress from requiring a witness
to testify about an embarrassing, humiliating, or degrading occurrence in more than one
trial. The public interest in not requiring the witness to undergo the trauma of testifying
more often than necessary far exceeds mere considerations of convenience, however important those may seem to the witness himself. Further, special consideration should be given
to the elderly or infirm witness because of the strain of testifying. See note 318 infra for a
discussion of decisions 'that attempt to make such distinctions.
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tion investigators, and others whose jobs include testifying in
court. While· time away from the patrol beat or the laboratory is
time away from important work, professional witnesses suffer little personal inconvenience or expense by testifying more than
once. Thus, when assessing the inconvenience that separate trials
impose on witnesses, we should ask whether testifying is part of
their jobs.
Furthermore, the parties can protect witnesses from multiple
appearances by stipulating necessary but undisputed noncritical
testimony. For example, the testimony of the owner of burglarized premises could be stipulated if there were no dispute that the
burglary took place. Stipulation should also eliminate repeated
testimony about laboratory results. Under appropriate circumstances, the trial court could even condition severance on stipulations of such testimony.
A third justification alleged for joint trials is that they conserve limited judicial resources. This efficiency is particularly
stressed when joinder reduces the number of jury trials because,
although jury trials are relatively infrequent in criminal cases,
they consume a substantial part of a judge's court time. 22 But
joint trials do not necessarily save judicial energy. They are far
more difficult to schedule than individual trials: as the number
of participants increases, it becomes harder to find a trial date
acceptable to court, prosecution, witnesses, and defense attorneys. Consequently, the court is likely to schedule a joint trial
later than an individual case. 23 Moreover, a joint trial is less likely
22. While the vast majority of criminal charges are disposed of without jury tria~ in dismissals, in guilty pleas, or in trials before the court - trial judges are understandably concerned about any increase in the number of jury trials that must be conducted.
In the year ending June 30, 1977, United States district courts disposed of 44,111 criminal
cases. ANNUAL REPORT OF THE DIRECTOR OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE OFFICE OF THE UNITED
STATES COURTS 115 (1977). Of these, 4561 (10%) were disposed of by jury trial, 2661 (6%)
by trials before the court, and the remainder (84%) by pleas of guilty and dismissals. Id.
at 275. A jury trial is a cumbersome proceeding. Even under the stem hand of a judge
determined to push ahead, it takes much longer to. dispose of a case by a jury trial than
by any other means, including a trial before the court. Of the 2661 jury-waived criminal
cases before United States district courts in the same year, 2149 (81%) were disposed of
in one day or less, while only 885 of the 4561 jury trials (19%) were disposed of in one day
or less. Id. at 352. Thus, although a judge may dispose of only 5 to 10% of his docket by
jury trial, it takes only a small number of additional jury trials to destroy his calendar.
For some judges, an addition of two or three criminal jury trials per year would represent
a 25% increase in criminal jury trials. During the year ending June 30, 1977, there were
398 authorized United States district court judgeships, Id. at 112. Since there were 4561
criminal cases disposed of by jury trial during that year, that means there were 11.5
criminal jury trials per judge, or about one a month.
23. Congressional recognition that joinder of defendants is likely to d~lay the begin-
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to begin on schedule. If another case detains one of the defense
attorneys longer than expected, the court must sever that attor.,
ney's client, place the entire case on hold until the other trial is
over, or select a new trial date acceptable to all participants. 2~
Depending upon the arrangements for backup trials, the second
and third choices may consume substantial court time.
In addition, once begun, joint trials are more complicated to
conduct and take longer to complete than individual trials. In
some jurisdictions the trial court must determine how multiple
defendants may challenge potential jurors, a decision unnecessary to an individual trial. 25 The trial judge must also work out
the order in which the defense participates, since defense attorneys are likely to have different ideas about who should crossexamine first, 26 present defenses. first, and argue to the jury last,
ning of trial of a criminal case appears in § 101 of the Speedy Trial Act of 1974, 18 U.S.C.
§§ 3161-3174 (1976). The Act provides that trial must begin within specified time limits
but provides that delay for certain pretrial proceedings "shall be excluded in computing
the time . . . within which the trial of any such offense must commence •.•• " 18 U,S.C.
§ 3161(h) (1976). The following periods of delay, among others, are excluded: examination
and hearing for determination of competency to stand trial, time during which a defendant is actually incompetent to stand trial, time resulting from interlocutory appeals,
delay resulting from the granting of the government's or a defendant's motion for continuance. 18 U.S.C. § 316l(h) (1976). If the case of one defendant is properly delayed under
the Act so that the time limits have not run as to him, then the Act further provides for
exclusion of "a reasonable period of delay when the defendant is joined for trial with a
codefendant as to whom the time for trial has not run and no motion for severance has
been granted." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(7) (1976). Finally, the trial court is cautioned against
liberally granting motions for continuance but is instructed to consider as a factor in
deciding upon such a motion "[w]hether the case taken as a whole is so unusual and so
complex, due to the number of defendants or the nature of the prosecution or otherwise,
that it is unreasonable to expect adequate preparation within the periods of time established by this section." 18 U.S.C. § 3161(h)(8)(B)(ii) (1976).
24. Of course, when more witnesses are involved it is more likely that at least one
will become unavailable. This is especially true of expert witnesses who may be testifying
in other litigation or may have other professional commitments. Frequently, rescheduling
the order in which witnesses testify will compensate for temporarily unavailable witnesses,
25. For example, FED. R. CRIM. P. 24 provides that each side has 20 peremptory
challenges in a capital case, 6 in noncapital felony cases, and 3 in other cases, However,
FED. R. CRIM. P. 24(b) provides, "If there is more than one defendant, the court may allow
the defendants additional peremptory challenges and permit them to be exercised separately or jointly." In Martin v. State, 262 Ind. 232, 317 N.E.2d 430 (1974), cert, denied,
420 U.S. 911 (1975), the Indiana Supreme Court upheld a statute requiring coaefendants
to join in exercising peremptory challenges against an attack based upon equal protection
of the laws.
26. A. AMsTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, TRIAL MANUAL FOR THE DEFENSE OF CRIMI•
NAL CASES 1-275 (3d ed. 1974), suggests that joined defendants wondering whether to seek
severance should consider whether, under local practice, "counsel's cross-examination of
prosecution witnesses [will] be cut off as 'cumulative' of that of counsel for a codefendant."
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whether there should be opening statements to the jury, and
when they should be made. 27 The judge may even have to arrange
seating. 28 During trial, a judge must expect many more objections
from defense attorneys in a joint trial. In part, this is because
more lawyers are available to object, each with a different interest
to protect. But more important, as the number of defense attorneys increases, it is less likely that all will decide for tactical
reasons not to object when an opportunity is presented. Furthermore, each attorney must object to evidence that damages his
client, even if that evidence is admissible against a codefendant,
particularly if the attorney is attempting a build an appellate
record of prejudice from joinder. While the court may rule on
many objections as they are made, many others will require extensive arguments or lengthy testimony outside the presence of
the jury. 29
A fourth presumed justification for joint trials is that they
reduce the cost of appeals. For example, if a joint trial ends with
two or more convictions that are appealed, only one trial tran27. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS REI.ATING'I'O DrsCOVERY AND PROCEDURE BEFORE TRIAL § 5.4 (Approved Draft, 1970), recommends the trial
court conduct a pretrial conference when it anticipates the trial will be unusually complicated. The Standard recognizes as appropriate for resolution in a pretrial conference the
following matters relating to multiplicity of defendants:
(iv) excision from admissible statements of material prejudiciai to a codefendant;
(v) severance of defendants or offenses;
(vi) seating arrangements for defendants and counsel; •..
(viii)' conduct of voir dire;
(ix) number and use of peremptory challenges;
(x) procedure on objections where there are multiple counsel;
(xi) order of presentation of evidence and arguments where there are multiple
defendants;
(xii) order of cross-examination where there are multip!e counsel;
28. See, e.g., Kaufman, The Apalachin Trial: Further Observations on the Pre-Trial
in Criminal Cases, 44 J. AM.. Juo. Socv. 53, 56 (1960): "Since the physical arrangement
of the courtroom in a multi-defendant case is important, the attorneys were permitted to
set up their own seating, subject again to the approval of the Court."
29. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-356:
When questions of fact are involved in determining the applicability of a rule
governing the admission of evidence, the trial judge ordinarily decides those questions as trier of fact, even at a jury trial. When such preliminary factual questions
are presented on defense objection to any item of prosecutive evidence worth objecting to in the first place, it is ordinarily important for-defense counsel to ask that
the jury be excused during the presentation of testimony . . . on the preliminary
question.
Of course, some of the time consumed litigating the admissibility of evidence outside the
presence of the jury can be reduced by pretrial hearings on motions to suppress and by
pretrial argumettts on motions in limine. Even so, in a case even moderately complex, the
time consumed with the jury out of the courtroom is likely to be substantial.

1388

Michigan Law Review

[Vol. 77:1379

script is needed, 30 since some of the issues are likely to be common
to each appeal. The savings in court reporter and stenographic
time may be small or substantial, depending upon the number of
appellants and the issues they raise. But joinder may prove more
expensive if only a minor participant appeals on the ground that
the trial was unfair to him because he was such a minor figure. 31
To demonstrate that prejudice, he may have to present the entire
trial transcript to show that only a small portion involved him.
On balance, several unpredictable variables determine whether a
joint trial reduces the time and expense of an appeal. If the defense attorneys present a unified attack upon the convictions, the
savings for all parties during the briefing and oral argument may
be substantial. But those savings are lost for points of error
unique to each appellant. Moreover, each appellant may raise
individual reasons why his joinder with the others particularly
prejudiced him - appellate issues that would not have existed
had the trials been separate. 32
Some might suggest that joint trials can offer economies for
the defense. In some cases, two or more defendants may employ
or be assigned the same counsel to defend them, although the
increasing sensitivity of appellate courts to the potential conflict
of interests in multiple-defendant representation makes this less
likely today than before. 33 In theory, even if each defendant had
separate counsel, the lawyers could improve the defense of each
by coordinating their time, knowledge, and skills. Since each trial
lawyer has his own strengths and weaknesses, they could mount
a much stronger defense through a division of labor. 34
30. The appellate court may order the appeals consolidated so they may be presented
upon a single record. See FED. R. APP. P. 3(b).
31. See text at notes 97-101 infra.
32. A similar observation was made by Justice Marshall, dissenting in Nelson v.
O'Neill, 402 U.S. 622, 635 (1971):
Those that argue for the use of joint trials contend that joint trials, although often
resulting in prejudice to recognized rights of one or more of the codefendants, are
justified because of the saving of time, money, and energy that result. But, as this
case shows, much of the supposed saving is lost through protracted litigation that
results from the impingement or near impingement of a codefendant's right of
confrontation and equal protection.
33. See, e.g., Holloway v. Arkansas, 435 U.S. 475 (1978); State v. Olsen, 258 N.W.2d
898 (Minn. 1977). For an excellent discussion of the entire topic of multiple representation
of criminal defendants, see Geer, Representation of Multiple Criminal Defendants: Conflicts of Interest and the Professional Responsibilities of the Defense Attorney, 62 MtNN,
L. R.Ev. 119 (1978).
34. One author has suggested that in multi-defense-counsel cases one attorney be
designated "senior" or "coordinating" counsel, to act as "advisory attorney with respect
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But there are flaws in this idyllic scene. If the quality of the
attorneys varies, the poor lawyer may hinder the skillful one. 35
Even among competent attorneys cooperation will be less than
perfect because each defense attorney must be acutely aware of
his responsibility to his own client. They will cooperate only if
cooperation furthers each client's interests. Furthermore, each
must be aware that at any time before the end of the trial one
defendant may strike a deal with the prosecutor, testify against
the others, and reveal the ~ntire deferise strategy to the government. Alert attorneys also remember that sometimes government
informants are "prosecuted" jointly with real defendants, in part
to preserve their covers. 38 Even when defense attorneys want to
cooperate, each must remain somewhat uneasy about what the
others will do. That uneasiness negates many of the benefits joinder may bestow on the defense.
2.

The Underlying Assumption

Underlying these supposed efficiencies is an assumption that
if defendants are not joined, each will undergo a separate jury
trial. There are, however, good reasons to question that assumption. When cases are severed,. the first trial may well be the only
trial: its results will often prompt the litigants to dispose of the
remaining cases without trial, or at least without jury trial. The
first trial will answer a number of questions for the litigants. Will
a jury find the prosecution's theory of liability persuasive? Will
civilian witnesses cooperate? Will a jury believe the witnesses?
Will the court admit critical pieces of evidence?
To the extent a case goes to trial because of uncertainty
about strength of proof, credibility of witnesses, and acceptability
of different theories to a jury, answering some or all of these
questions will quickly lead to settlement of remaining cases. After
the first trial, each party can evaluate its chances much more
accurately and may settle the case without trial or may, if the
only substantial issues remaining are legal, waive a jury trial.
to those areas in which the interests of all defendants are the same." Wessel, Procedural
Safeguards for the Mass Conspiracy Trial, 48 A.B.A.J. 628 (1962).
·
35. "Referral of potential co-defendants to other counsel stems not only from the
desire to control litigation, but also from the need to assure competent co-counsel, both
before and at trial, since error by one counsel often influences the outcome of the whole
case." Margolin, Representing Multiple Defendants in Criminal Cases, in PRACTICING LAW
INSTITUTE, 15TH ANNUAL: DEFENDING CRIMINAL CASES 497 (1977) .
.36. See, e.g., Weatherford v. Bursey, 42~ U.S. 545 (1977).
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Therefore, the prosecutor will often seek to try the most serious
and strongest case first, hoping the results will encourage the
other defendants to accept more reasonable terms. In addition,
one or more of the defendants may aid his own cause by offering
to testify for the prosecution against his codefendants. 37 When
that is acceptable to the prosecution, it not only eliminates the
trial of the defendant who testifies for the government, but also
tends to promote rapid settlement of the other cases. 38
The prosecutor may have personal reasons to dislike sequential jury trials. Trying a second codefendant is like viewing the
rerun of a movie: it lacks the uncertainty that makes a criminal
trial exciting for an active prosecutor. For that reason, he, too,
may be more willing to settle the second case than the first. For
the same reason, the news media are likely to give a second trial
less extensive coverage and so a prosecutor motivated by media
exposure will not have that incentive the second time around.
Finally, empirical data do not support the conventional wisdom that severing cases burdens the criminal justice system with
sequential jury trials. One study suggests that when defendants
have a right of severance, sequential trials are rare. In 1973, Vermont provided a right of severance in all felony cases punishable
by· more than five years' imprisonment. 39 A 1973 survey of Vermont trial judges and prosecutors found that "joint trials are
virtually unheard of, " 40 even in cases, such as misdemeanors, not
within the statutory right of severance. The survey also shows
that when severance is granted, the first trial is the only trial, a
phenomenon the author terms the "domino theory":
The verdict of the first defendant tried has a great deal of bearing
on the disposition of the other defendants charged with the same
offense. . . . In a vast majority of the cases, an initial conviction
has induced the awaiting codefendants to negotiate a plea. . . .
Thus, the experience has been that a single trial of one defendant
37. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-92: "The police or the
prosecution will sometimes offer a client the opportunity to 'cooperate' by testifying
against accomplices in exchange for dismissal or reduction of charges, or for recommendation of leniency to the trial judge."
38. Id. at 1-102: "A codefendant may turn state's evidence at any time; and his
testimony is likely to be decisive at trial." Once the prosecutor has arranged for the
testimony of a codefendant, he is likely to tell the defendant that he has done so in hope
of inducing him to plead guilty and avoiding the ordeal of trial.
39. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6507 (1958) (repealed 1973). This right did not extend
to conspiracy cases. Vermont has since expanded the right of severance. See note 315 infra.
40. Langrock, Joint Trials: A Short Lesson From Little Vermont, 9 CRIM, L. BULL.
612, 616 (1973).
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has resulted in the disposition of almost all the charges stemming
out of the single crime, and this has occurred without the length
of the joint trial and the attendant complications that almost always go with such a trial. 41

The survey concludes that "[i]t was felt by both judges and
prosecutors that the resultant economy weighed in favor of separate trials rather than a joint trial. " 42 If that analysis is correct,
then in deciding upon a motion for severance, a trial court should
not expect sequential trials after severance but rather one trial
followed by disposition of the remaining cases without trial. Severance would promote, rather than impede, the efficient administration of justice and conservation of resources.

B. Justifications Other Than Efficiency
Although the principal argument in favor of joint trials is
efficiency in the administration of criminal justice, other arguments are made as well. To continue with the quotation from
Justice White's dissent in Bruton v. United States: 43
It is also worth saying that separate trials are apt to have varying
consequences for legally indistinguishable defendants. The unfairness of this is confirmed by the common prosecutorial experience
of seeing codefendants who are tried separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to be tried.~~

Do joint trials ensure, or even tend to. ensure, consistency of
result? Are separate trials inherently unfair to some of the
co defendants?
'Justice White could have been objecting to either or both of
two inconsistencies when he spoke of the "varying consequences"
of individual trials: unjustifiably different jury verdicts concerning single past events or unjustifiably different sentences for convicted codefendants. According to the first objection, for different
juries to reach different verdicts on the same evidence is undeniably unjust, and to the extent the legal system can minimize the
likelihood of this unjustness, it should do so. Therefore, joint
trials should be held whenever feasible.
Although superficially appealing, this argument has several
weaknesses. First, it is usually impossible to determine whether
separate juries have reached truly inconsistent verdicts. Almost
41.
42.
43.
44.

Id. at 616-17.
Id. at 617.
391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968). See text at note 15 supra.
391 U.S. at 143.
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always the evidence admissible in different trials against alleged
coparticipants in ·an offense will differ enough to permit different
treatment by the jury. Similarly, if different lawyers have represented defendants in sequential trials, differences in their competency, zeal, or preparation may affect the juries' verdicts.
Second, our society has made it clear by adopting the jury
system that it values other considerations more than mere consistency of result. One does not have to acknowledge jury nullification to accept that a jury introduces greater uncertainty into
all trials: this uncertainty is tolerated for the sake of greater procedural values. In separate, sequential trials, skilled attorneys
will select juries best suited to the individual clients. Perhaps a
defendant's right through counsel to select a jury suited to try his
particular case is an important trial right, one which a joint trial
with its inevitable "compromise jury"45 should not be able to
override in the name of "consistency." 46
Third, a joint trial does not guarantee consistency of result
even when the evidence against each defendant is identical. The
jury must decide each case individually. It is reversible error to
instruct a jury that the codefendants must "sink or swim together" ;47 no matter how much the evidence commands that two
defendants be treated the same, the court must instruct the jury
45. In some jurisdictions defendants tried jointly are required to exercise peremptory
jury challenges jointly. ABA PROJECT ON MINIMUM STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STAN•
DAROS RELATING TO TRIAL BY JURY 72-75 (Approved Draft, 1968) discusses the types of
provisions dealing with peremptory challenges in joint trials. The Commentary states that
it may well be desirable to give each defendant at least some challenges which may
be independently exercised, as only in this way can such a defendant protect himself (apart from challenge for cause) from a venireman who is prejudiced only
against him. Affording such protection has been one of the traditional explanations
for the peremptory challenge .•. and thus it does not appear that a codefendant
should be denied all challenges except those to which all codefendants agree. In
cases involving many defendants, it may be difficult or impossible to obtain such
agreement.
Id. at 74-75.
46. See note 204 infra and accompanying text. Most questioning at voir dire examination is intended to permit the attorneys to exercise their peremptory challenges more
intelligently, rather than to uncover grounds for challenges for cause.
Counsel preparing to select a jury through the exercise of challenges should bear in
mind the kind of jury that is appropriate for the defense case. Some jurors will be
bad jurors for the defense in any type of case; others will be good for some kinds of
cases but not for others.
lA S. BERNSTEIN, CRIMINAL DEFENSE TECHNIQUES 21-44 (Supp. 1979). The right of peremp•
tory challenge has been called "one of the most important of the rights secured 'to the
accused." Pointer v. United States, 151 U.S. 396, 408 (1894).
47. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Lester, 223 Pa. Super. Ct. 473, 475, 302 A.2d 609,
510 (1973) (error for the trial court to instruct the jury that since the defendants are
charged as accomplices, "they sink or swim together. If they are innocent they are innocent together. If they are guilty- they are ·guilty together.")
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that it may return a verdict of guilty for one and not guilty for
the other. 48 When a jury in a joint trial has reached what an
appellate court regards as inconsistent verdicts, the court is likely
to reverse the judgment against the convicted codefendant out of
concern for fairness between codefendants. 49
Finally, the consistency-of-verdict argument makes the same
faulty assumptiqn that the efficiency argument makes: that related defendants will each go through a trial. But, as shown
above, sequential trials are unlikely in that situation, because the
first case will probably form the basis for disposition of the others
without trial. 50 To the extent the jury's verdict in the first case
sets the standard for disposition of the other cases, severance
avoids potential inconsistent jury verdicts and fosters equal treatment of defendants.
Justice White's concern for "varying consequences" 51 may
also embrace sentencing of those convicted. Yet such a concern
is no more justified than the objection to varying verdicts. It is
nearly impossible to determine if sentences vary unjustifiably
because the factors that may legitimately influence the imposition of individual sentences are virtually without limit. 52 In most
American jurisdictions the trial judge, not the jury, is responsible
for sentencing one convicted by a jury. 53 If the same judge presides at all the sequential trials, his sentences should be as consistent as if they were handed down after a joint trial. Indeed, a
judge may postpone sentencing until each of the cases is completed and then consider the sentencing of all together. 54 If differ48. For example, in State v. Lockamy, 31 N.C. App. 713, 230 S.E.2d 565 (1976), tlie
trial court did not give a "sink or swim together" charge, but failed to instruct the jury
clearly that it might find one defendant guilty and the other not guilty. Although the
evidence against each was identical and there is no indication in the opinion that either
defendant presented a defense to the government's case, the conviction was reversed:
"[T]he trial judge must either give a separate final mandate as to each defendant or
otherwise clearly instruct the jury that the guilt or innocence of one defendant is not
dependent upon the guilt or innocence of a codefendant." 230 S.E.2d at 568.
49. See, e.g., People v. Beasley, 41 Ill. App. 3d 550, 353 N.E.2d 699 (1976).
50. See text at notes 37-42 supra.
51. See text at note 44 supra.
52. See, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (upholding imposition of
a more severe sentence of one believed to have committed perjury in his defense on the
ground that he has thereby demonstrated bleak prospects for rehabilitation).
53. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO SENTENCING ALTERNATIVES AND PROCEDURES 43-44 (Approved Draft, 1968) reports that only
thirteen states permit jury sentencing in noncapital cases.
54. Another method of achieving the same result would be for the trial judge to select
and impose sentence upon conviction and to make consistency adjustments through mo-
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ent trial judges preside at sequential trials and sentence those
convicted, then the potential problems of sentence disparity are
only slightly more troublesome than the problems in sentencing
criminal defendants in unrelated cases.
Are there any other reasons to believe that joint trials might
be fairer than severed trials? At least three possibilities suggest
themselves: (1) that a joint trial "serves to give the jury a complete overall view of the whole scheme and helps them see how
each piece fits into the whole pattern, " 55 (2) that a joint trial
eliminates the unfairness of forcing one defendant to be tried
before his codefendants, and (3) that a joint trial precludes the
danger of blame shifting between codefendants. When examined
closely, however, none of the three is a persuasive argument for
joint trials.
The argument for giving the jury an "overall view" fails because it ignores the prosecutor's ability and duty to present all
evidence relevant to a defendant's role in an offense whether the
trial is individual or joint. If the "overall view" argument calls for
the admission of evidence unrelated to the defendant on trial,
then it calls for unfair prejudice. If, on the other hand, it seeks
to encourage the prosecutor to marshall all evidence admissible
against the defendant, it seeks vigorous prosecution, an aim only
marginally promoted by the clumsy apparatus of a joint trial.
Neither interpretation supports a claim that joint trials are fairer
than individual ones.
Another justification for joint trials is that they avoid the
discrimination between the defendant tried first and those tried
later. The advantages of being tried second or third in a series advantages from deterioration of evidence, from discovery of the
prosecution's case, and from additional grounds for impeachment
of prosecution witnesses - would seem to support the more uniform treatment that joinder imposes on codefendants. Under
·closer examination, however, those advantages no longer appear
so extraordinary; indeed, in many instances significant countervailing advantages accompany the first to trial.
Ordinarily, a defendant, guilty or innocent, prefers to delay
his trial. Time undeniably weakens the government's case: wittions to reduce sentence. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 35 (permitting reduction within 120 days
after imposition of sentence or affirmance on appeal).
55. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOIN•
DER AND SEVERANCE 39 (Approved Draft, 1968) (quoting from Rakes v. United States, 169
F.2d 739, 744 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 335 U.S. 826 (1948)).
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nesses die, move from the court's jurisdiction, and lose crisp
memories; 58 prosecutorial zeal wanes and public attention wanders. Severing joint defendants may deny these benefits to the
one who goes first and may unfairly favor later defendants over
both the first one and the government. Although few would infer
from this fact that every defendant should be guaranteed the
blessing of delay, to believe that its benefits should not be distributed unequally is quite defensible.
Another advantage of being tried later is the chance to use
the first trial to discover the government's case - to study it to
an extent far beyond that permissible under even the most liberal
discovery statutes or rules of court. That advantage, however, is
slimmer than it may appear. In practice, criminal discovery regularly overreaches the strictures of the formal laws. Commonly,
prosecutors disclose to the defense substantially all the information in their case files 57 even though statutes and rules of court
may restrict discovery to only a few items. Furthermore, testimony of witnesses on whether there is probable cause to hold the
defendant for grand jury indictment, 58 whether a stop, arrest, or
search was valid, whether an admission or statement was lawfully
obtained, or how an eyewitness observed the offender often
emerges in pretrial hearings. 59 While all of these opportunities for
taking the testimony of a witness under oath' have purposes other·
than discovery, discovery inevitably follows. 60 In some jurisdictions, the defendant may even depose prosecution witnesses. 61 All
these ordinary opportunities for pretrial discovery significantly
56. "If separate trials must be held, then 'the defendants will be placed in unequal
positions, with some gaining the advantage of disclosure of the Government's case and
the possibility of witnesses' deaths and fading memories making proof of the charge ever
more difficult."' Id. (quoting from United States v. Stromberg, 22 F.R.D. 513, 525
(S.D.N.Y.), affd. in part, revd. in part, 268 F.2d 256 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 361 U.S. 863
(1959). This was probably what Justice White was referring to in his Bruton dissent when
he noted "the common prosecutorial experience of seeing codefendants who are tried
separately strenuously jockeying for position with regard to who should be the first to be
tried." 391 U.S. 123, 143 (1968). See text at note 44 supra.
57. The practice of informal discovery is discussed in Comment, Texas Criminal
Discovery, 47 TEXAS L. REv. 1182 (1969). The prosecutor wants defendants to plead guilty
and sees generous pretrial discovery as the first step toward plea bargaining.
58. A preliminary hearing is authorized in federal prosecutions by FED. R. CRIM. P.
5.1.
59. Pretrial hearings are authorized by FED. R. CRIM. P. 12.
60. Indeed, discovery is frequently the principal motive for initiating all of these
proceedings. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-121 to -122,
1-131 to -132 (use of the preliminary hearing as a discovery tool).
61. See, e.g., TEX. CODE CRIM. PRoc. ANN. art. 39.02 (Vernon 1979) (authorizing
depositions of prosecution witnesses upon a showing of "a good re!lson").
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reduce the· incremental value to defendants not tried first of observing the first trial.
Severing cases may also allow defendants who do not go first
to impeach a witness in a subsequent trial with inconsistent testimony from the first trial. Viewed from one perspective, this does
not advance the search for truth because any witness who testifies
more than once about the same subject will vary his statement
enough to provide skillful counsel with sources of impeachment.
Viewed from another perspective, however, impeachment assists
the search for truth, because a witness's testimony should not
vary substantially from one trial to another. Since the prosecution calls most witnesses in a criminal case, increasing the availability of impeachment material presents a tactical advantage for
the later defendant.
But as with discovery, various pretrial proceedings routinely
provide impeachment material. Normally in a felony case1 the
testimony of at least the police officer in charge of an investigation is taken at a preliminary hearing. 62 Furthermore, major witnesses may testify before the grand jury to assist it in deciding
whether to return an indictment. 63 Although witnesses are not
cross-examined before a grand jury, their testimony is ordinarily
recorded. In some jurisdictions defense counsel routinely receive
a transcript of such testimony as an aid to cross-examination. 04
Finally, the increasing use of evidentiary pretrial hearings in
which the testimony of important witnesses is taken provides
another opportunity for the defense to obtain impeachment material. 65
The principal advantage in not being tried first is that the
remaining defendants can better assess whether they should go
to trial at all. They have had the benefits of a jury's assessment
of the government's case. They should find the prosecutor more
willing to discuss disposition without trial, since the first trial has
probably wrung the maximum publicity from the case and the
prosecutor may not be anxious to "re-try" it before another jury
with a different defendant. Against these benefits must be bal62. FED. R. CRIM. P. 5.1 (c) authorizes transcription of the court reporter's notes of a
preliminary hearing and provision of a copy to the defense attorney.
63. FED. R. CRIM. P. 6(d).
64: The Jencks Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3500 (1976), requires disclosure of a government
witness's testimony before the grand jury after the witness has testified on direct examination at a trial.
65. See text at notes 58-59 supra.
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anced the disadvantages of not being tried first. In case with a
high publi~ interest, members of the jury panel are likely to have
read damaging reports of the previous trial that will hinder the
defense in selecting a jury. 66 A defendant in custody pending trial
also has an obvious interest in a prompt trial 67 even if conviction
means a certain prison sentence, since prison conditions are likely
to be superior to those in a local detention facility. Moreover, if
the first codefendant to be tried is convicted, he may get a lighter
sentence by volunteering to testify for the government. 68 Later
defendants have no such option.
A final justification for joint trials is that they determine
guilt or innocence more accurately because they prevent defendants from shifting blame to each other. In separate trials, each
defendant could take the stand, testify to his innocence, and
blame the offense on the absent codefendant. Conceivably, separate juries might each believe the testimony and acquit both. 69
Joint trials, however, are a poor solution to this problem. If defendants accused each other in a joint trial, the jury would not necessarily be any more able to decide if one or both were lying; in a
joint trial, both might be convicted although one was innocent.
Appellate courts consider it unfair to require a defendant to defend against accusations by both the governme_nt and a codefendant, 70 and would probably order severance in· this situation anyway. Therefore, this is no justification at all for joint trials.

II.

COSTS OF JOINT TRIALS: COMPLEXITY'S GENERAL IMPEDIMENTS
TO FAIRNESS AND lNDMDUAL JUSTICE

Joint trials are more complex to administer than individual
trials. Complexity reduces a trial's efficiency, but it also has a
66. However, it is also true that in a case exciting public interest, various pretrial
evidentiary hearings are likely to have publicized the case before the first trial is heid.
Under appropriate circumstances and with the consent of the defendants, a trial court
may close pretrial proceedings to the press and public. Gannett Co. v. DePasquale, 99 S.
Ct. 2898 (1979).
67. The Speedy Trial Act of 1974, § 101, 18 U.S.C. § 3164(b) (1976), provided as an
interim measure that persons in custody must be brought to trial within 90 days and that
calendar priority must be given to those cases. Some state speedy trial acts contain similar
provisions. See, e.g., 'I'Ex. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art.17.151, 32A.01 (Vernon Supp.1978).
68. "Prior trial of the codefendants may allow defense counsel full discovery of the
prosecution's case in advance of his own trial. On the other hand, if they are convicted,
they may turn state's evidence in an attempt to win sentencing consideration." A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-275.
69. See text at note 181 infra.
70. See text at notes 176-98 infra.
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more troubling consequence: complexity sometimes impairs the
ability of the jury to make fair and accurate determinations of
individual guilt or innocence. This problem is most severe in a
mass trial, when the multiplicity of defendants (and usually of
charges) tends to overwhelm all other aspects of the proceedings.
Yet even when the participants and charges are fewer, the complexity of a joint trial may confuse a jury about the responsibility
of the different defendants. At times, the jury may not be confused but may nonetheless so abhor the conduct of some defendants that it finds the remainder guilty by their association with
them. Courts respond to these dangers with the assumption that,
by careful control of the proceedings and by appropriate jury
instructions, they can eliminate the risks of confusion and guilt
by association. The validity of that assumption is vital to the
fairness of joint trials.

A. Mass Trials
It has been said that "a mass trial is contrary to the basic
principles of our jurisprudence."71 .The Standards Relating to
Joinder and Severance require severance of defendants when "it
is deemed appropriate to promote a fair determination of the guilt
or innocence of o])e or more defendants." 72 The Commentary explains that severance would be required under that standard
"when the case is so complex that the trier of fact cannot be
expected to keep straight the evidence relating to the various
defendants and charges." 73 Despite the reassurance of these general statements, 'many courts tolerate mass trials. 74
71. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 447 (quoting from United States v. Gaston, 37
F.R.D. 476, 477 (D.D.C. 1965)).
72. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOIN·
DER AND SEVERANCE 35 (Approved Draft, 1968).
73. Id. at 40.
74. See, e.g., United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434
U.S. 1020 (1977) (10 charges against 15 defendants); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d
120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977) (10 charges against 23 defendants);
United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139 (7th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 110 (1975)
(conspiracy charge against 24 defendants); United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846, 404 U.S. 958 (1971) (4 charges against 13 defendants); United
States v. Bentvena, 319 F.2d 916 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963) (8 charges
against 29 defendants, followed, after declaration of a mistrial, by a retrial of 3 charges
against 14 defendants); United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817 (2d Cir. 1962), cert. denied,
372 U.S. 959 (1963) (30 charges against 10 defendants); Commonwealth v. French, 357
Mass. 356, 259 N.E.2d 195 (1970), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 936 (1972) (4 charges
against 6 defendants).
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The Massachusetts "small loans cases, " 75 prosecuted in the
mid-sixties, illustrate the many difficulties of mass trials. A Massachusetts grand jury investigation of the small loan industry
yielded seventy indictments against a number of individuals and
corporations for conspiracy to bribe public officials. The Supreme
Judicial Court of Massachusetts eventually affirmed convictions
of many defendants, but the trials were judicial nightmares.
Pretrial motions consumed 75 court days and produced 4700
pages of transcript. 76 The prosecution divided the cases into two
groups for jury trial, but in fact the defendants named in each
trial overlapped substantially. The first jury faced 49 indictments
including at least 75 charges against 16 defendants; 77 the second
jury heard 21 indictments, including at least 35 charges against
15 defendants. 78 The first trial lasted five months and produced
over 7500 pages of transcript; 79 the second lasted twelve months
and produced over 11,800 pages of transcript. 8° Consolidated on
In United States v. Moreton, 25 F.R.D. 262 (W.D.N.Y. 1960), the government filed
an indictment charging 2,553 counts against 17 defendants. The trial court carved out for
trial 2 counts and 3 defendants, concluding:
[A] single trial of all defendants under this multi-count indictment, as now constituted, would be prejudicial to the defendants charged. The complex involvement
of the various defendants and the multiplicity of charges co'iifained in the indictment would render it difficult, if not impossible, for the court to adequately charge
a jury as to the applicable law with respect to each defendant and for the jury to
apply that law intelligently in reaching verdicts on the many charges involved.
25 F.R.D. at 263.
75. Commonwealth v. Beneficial Fin. Co., 360 Mass. 188, 275 N.E.2d 33 (1971), cert.
denied, 407 U.S. 910, 407 U.S. 914 (1972).
76. 360 Mass. at 200-01, 275 N.E.2d at 42.
77. 360 Mass. at 201, 376-84, 275 N.E.2d at 42, 139-42, app. B. Directed verdicts of
not guilty were entered on 15 of the 75 charges and jury verdicts were returned on 60.
Seventy-five must be a minimum figure, since many of the indictments charged more than
one offense and Appendix B does not disclose how many offenses an indictment charged
unless there is special reason for doing so (such as a guilty verdict on one count and a not
guilty verdict on another).
78. 360 Mass. at 376-84, 275 N.E.2d at 139-42 app. B. The defendants sought to
invoke the supervisory powers of the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts to stay the
second trial until after the appeal on the first trial had been decided. They argued that
"they have the burden of trying complex cases while equally complex appeals following
the first trial are being prosecuted" and that the "rigors of the present trial prevent them
from properly preparing their cases on appeal; or, conversely, that if their counsel concentrate on the appeals, they will be unable adequately to protect their clients in the present
trial." The court declined to stay the second trial and, as subsequent events made clear,
decided instead to delay the appeal from the first trial and consolidate it with the appeal
from the second trial. Barber v. Commonwealth, 353 Mass. 236,238,230 N.E.2d 817,819
(1967).
79. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N.E.2d at 42.
130. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N .E.2d at 43.
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appeal, the two cases consumed 137 pages of the Massachusetts
Reporter~ 1 and required a nine-page chart to separate the charges,
defendants, and verdicts. 8~ The appellate court unanimously affirmed all the convictions.
The juries clearly faced a Herculean task. Joinder of defendants anrl: charges led to intricate questions of fact. Much of the
Commonwealth's evidence was admitted for only a limited purpose - against only some defendants or with respect to only some
indictments - but sometimes the applicability of limited evidence was expanded to other defendants after further "linking"
emerged. The court instructed the jury on the use of the limited
evidence, both before and after it was admitted83 but even with
81. In the pretrial proceedings and the trials, the defendants took over 5,400 exceptions. They made about 700 assignments of error on appeal. 360 Mass. at 201, 275 N .E.2d
at 43. The court acknowledged that it was able to avoid needless "clutter" of the opinion
by omitting discussion of many of the assignments of error. It then reassured counsel that
"we have endeavored to consider and to give scrupulous attention to every assignment of
error argued by the defendants. If some assignment of error is not specifically referred to
in this opinion, a conclusion that we did not reflect on it would be far from accurate,"
360 Mass. at 202-03, 275 N.E.2d at 43.
82. 360 Mass. at 374-76, 275 N.E.2d at 137-42 app. A.
83. The problems created by the limited use of evidence so pervaded both trials that
the appellate court was forced to use a footnoting system of alphabetical symbols to
indicate against whom the particular evidence discussed in the text was admitted:
[T]hroughout the lengthy trial, items of evidence were admitted subject to
limitations. In order to recite the evidence without stating each limitation, we have
adopted the following system ••. which indicates what evidence was admitted
against which defendants and subsequently expanded to include other defendants.
Each defendant is referred to in connection with a particular item of evidence by
footnote [using the first letter of the defendant's surname for identification].
Where evidence admitted against a defendant was limited to a specific indictment
or count thereof, this is stated following the symbol used for that defendant. Where
original limitations were expanded to include other defendants, following the preliminary ruling by the judge as to the existence of a conspiracy, the expanded
limitations are shown in parentheses following the original limitations. Thus a
footnote which reads "P, G, Hly 11976 (H, B)" means that the item of evidence
referred to by the footnote was originally admitted against Pratt and Glynn, and
against Hanley only on Indictment 11976, and that following the preliminary ruling
the limitation was expanded to include Household and Beneficial.
360 Mass. at 231 n.12, 275 N.E.2d at 59 n.12.
Presumably the jury did not have the benefit of this evidentiary roadmap. In Massachusetts the judge delivers an oral charge to the jury after the attorneys have argued. See
Commonwealth v. Therrien, 371 Mass. 203, 355 N.E.2d 913 (1976). The appellate court's
opinion in Beneficial Finance suggests that, despite the length and complexity of the trials
in that case, the trial court delivered an oral charge, rather than a written one that the
jury could use during deliberations. One portion of the court's charge to the jury quoted
by the appellate court was, "the Commonwealth must prove as to a particular defendant
. . . that he, by his own actions, words, or conduct entered into an agreement with one
or more other persons to commit a crime. Now, this is not the same thing as talking to
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the help of court and counsel, how could a jury fairly and accurately adjudicate cases of such incredible complexity, tried over
such a length of time, and involving such complicated decisions?
How could a jury, faced with such confusing questions, determine
the fate of so many defendants with the sagacity the law
contemplates? Joinder may have achieved some efficiencies in
those cases, but did the trials evaluate each defendant as fairly
as the law demands? 84

B. Jury Confusion and Guilt by Association
Much more common than mass trials are joint trials whose
complexities threaten to confuse the jury or whose complications
might tempt the jury to find defendants guilty by association.
Claims of jury confusion in joint trials grow from concern that
even a careful jury may apply evidence erroneously or, in the face
of momentous and complex proceedings, may abdicate its responsibility to sift the evidence meticulously before deciding individsomebody about somebody else's committing a crime." 360 Mass. at 301, 275 N.E.2d at
98. See text at notes 105-06 infra for a comparison of oral and written jury charges.
84. In United States v. Agueci, 310 F.2d 817· (2d Cir. 1962), Judge Kaufman, in an
opinion affirming the convictions of all IO appellants who had been tried in a joint trial,
discussed the difficulties created by such trials and then blamecf'the United States Attorney for failing to scale down the size of such conspiracy prosecutions:
This mass-conspiracy case, in presenting us with a great number of difficult
problems arising in the course of two months of trial, and in which the record
consumed almost 8000 pages, is not untypical of many cases that have come before
this Court in the past. . . . The trial of these multiple-defendant conspiracy cases
poses a great problem for the district judge. We recognize that if a narcotics conspiracy is of such dimension as to include a confusing array of defendants, it is inherent
in the nature of the crime that the trial is certain to be rather protracted. The great
problem confronting the district judge is therefore one of trial management. The
jury must constantly be made aware of the fact that there are separate individuals
on trial and that each must be judged solely on the evidence properly admissible
against him. The difficulties of compartmentalizing the independent evidence in
the mass-conspiracy case, and of focussing the attention of the jury on that evidence
before consideration may be given to hearsay, are so manifest that we would labor
the point were we to say more • . . . Judges . . . are confined for months on end,
engaged in trying these cases.
The solution to these problems of judicial administration of the criminal law
which we recognize to be difficult to find, is largely in the hands of the United
States Attorney, for he is in a position in the first instance to determine whether it
would be more in the interests of criminal justice to restrict the number of defendants tried at any one time. If such were done, then it would be possible to minimize
the harassing problems arising from the participation of the great number of separate counsel representing individual defendants, each pursuing his own course in
seeking the acquittal of his client.
·
310 F.2d at 840.
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ual liability. Any joint trial with enough proof of guilt to reach
the jury invites questions about whether the jury deliberated rationally. One must always worry that the jury might have reached
its verdicts through misunderstanding of the entire case, uncertainty about who is supposed to have done what, or confusion
about what evidence was admissible against whom. 85
Appellate courts, perhaps reluctant to inquire into jury deliberations, have greeted claims of jury confusion with hostility.
In Opper v. United States, 86 Justice Reed rejected the concept of
jury confusion:
To say that the jury might have been confused amounts to nothing
more than an unfounded speculation that the jurors disregarded
clear instructions of the court in arriving at their verdict. Our
theory of trial relies upon the ability of ij jury to follow instructions. 87

As Justice Reed suggests, claims of jury confusion are ordinarily
speculative. The legal system insulates former jurors from the
very inquiry necessary to establish jury confusion other than by
inferences from the evidence presented at trial. 88 Many jurisdictions restrict investigation of a jury's deliberations. 89 And even
when presented with evidence of irrational deliberation, most
trial courts are reluctant to provide full legal remedies. 90 In unusual circumstancE:ls, an appellate court may infer jury confusion
from the evidence, but such inference is rare. 91
85. Of course; there are safeguards against egregious jury confusion in any trial when
proof of guilt is so insubstantial as to be legally insufficient, compelling an acquittal or a
reversal on appeal. See FEo. R. CRIM. P. 29; Burks v. United States, 437 U.S. 1 (1978).
86. 348 U.S. 84 (1954).
87. 348 U.S. at 95. In subsequent cases, the Supreme Court has recognized the limits
of juries' abilities to follow the trial court's instructions. See Bruton v. United States, 391
U.S. 123 (1968); Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964). Bruton is examined later. See
text at notes 127-75 infra.
88. One can posit policy considerations for these restrictions. Prohibitions on interviewing former jurors may be justified to prevent harassment of former jurors and, indirectly, to encourage citizens to serve on juries. Prohibitions on a juror's impeaching his
· own verdict may stem from a fear that a juror, remorseful over finding a defendant guilty,
will fabricate testimony about irrational decisional processes in order to upset the verdict,
hence the rule that the testimony may go only to external influences on the juror's vote
that are capable of being corroborated or refuted by other evidence. See note 90 infra.
89. Interviewing former jurors to uncover jury misconduct is disapproved by a number of courts. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 493-94.
90. Many courts take the position that a juror may not impeach his verdict by
testimony in a hearing on a motion for new trial. He is permitted, however, to testify to
extraneous influences upon his decision. See id. at 492-93. Jury confusion in a joint trial
is not an extraneous influence. Id.
91. In United States v. Wasson, 568 F.2d 1214, 1222-23 (5th Cir. 1978), the attorney
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A few jurisdictions have expressed concern over potential
jury confusion in certain kinds of joint trials. A Colorado rule of
court provides, "[I]f the court finds that the prosecution probably will present against a joint defendant evidence, other than
reputation or character testimony, which would not be admissible
in a separate trial of the moving defendant," then the court must
grant a severance. 92 In Wisconsin, case law has produced a similar
rule: Severance is usually discretionary, but it is required if there
is "an entire line of evidence relevant to the liability of only one
defendant [that] may be treated as evidence against all defendants by the trier of fact." 93
The danger that a jury may find guilt by association is closely
related to the danger of jury confusion. In each the jury may
irrationally apply evidence to find guilt. But a jury that finds a
for the government conceded in jury argument that there y;as ·insufficient proof that one
defendant participated in the conspiracy. Nevertheless, the jury convicted him of that
offense. This and another conviction from the same trial were reversed on appeal on the
ground that the jury obviously was confused as to what evidence applied to which defendants.
~
By contrast, in United States v. Fuel, 583 F.2d 987 (8th Cir. 1978}, three defendants
were charged with conspiracy to commit mail fraud and with various substantive mail
fraud offenses allegedly arising out of an insurance fraud scheme., '.!;'he jury convicted them
of conspiracy and of several substa1;1tive counts, but the con.spiracy convictions were
reversed on appeal because of insufficient evidence of agreement among the defendants.
-The appellate court then affirmed convictions on the substantive counts, rejecting a claim
that the cases should have been severed because there existed an unacceptable risk of jury
confusion:
We recognize that there is an inherent danger in a joint trial that the jury will
convict on the basis of the cumulative evidence produced at trial, rather than on
the basis of the quantum of evidence relating to each defendant. . . . However, a
defendant is not automatically entitled to severance because the evidence against
a codefendant is more damaging than the evidence against him.
Here, the trial court carefully instructed the jury that it should weigh the
evidence against each defendant individually. . . . While the evidence presented'
at trial was complex and confusing, the trial court could reasonably have believed
that the jury was capable of compartmentalizing the evidence. The fact that it
failed to do so with respect to some of the grounds is insufficient justification for
us to now hold that the trial court abused its discretion in denying severance.
583 F.2d at 988. But see United States v. Lane, 584 F.2d 60 (5th Cir. 1978) (finding an
unacceptable risk of jury confusion in a case in which the government failed to prove its
conspiracy charge).
92. COLO. R. CRIM. P. 14. The defendants' convictions for delivery of LSD and hashish
were reversed in People v. Story, 182 Colo. 122, 511 P.2d 492 (1973), because the judge
refused to give a cautionary instruction about evidence that a third· defendant told an
undercove; officer that he had sold LSD to high school students. New Mexico has enacted
a similar rule. N.M.R. CRIM. P. 34. See State v. Volkman, 86 N.M. 529,525 P.2d 889 (Ct.
App. 1974).
93. State v. Nutley, 24 Wis. 2d 527, 543, 129 N.W.2d 155, 171 (1964), cert. denied,
380 U.S. 918 (1965).
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defendant guilty by association fully understands the evidence;
nonetheless, it paints each member of the group with the same
brush of blame, without pausing to ponder the difficult questions
of individual responsibility. Justice Jackson, concurring in
Krulewitch v. United States, 94 expressed the danger of guilt by
association:
A co-defendant in a conspiracy trial occupies an uneasy seat.
There generally will be evidence of wrong-doing by somebody. It
is difficult for the individual to make his own case stand on its own
merits in the minds of jurors who are ready to believe that birds
of a feather are flocked together. If he is silent, he is taken to admit
it and if, as often happens, co-defendants can be prodded into
accusing or contradicting each other, they convict each other.u:;

Joinder, therefore, places upon defendants the heavy burden
of proving nonparticipation in the criminal activities of the group
the prosecutor has defined with his joinder decisions. While a
defendant who has his trial severed may carry that burden and
win an acquittal, joined defendants face a harder task. Perhaps
this is what courts mean when they acknowledge that severance
ordinarily increases a defendant's chances of acquittal. 00
The problems of jury confusion and guilt by association
emerge most clearly in the joinder of minor and major figures.
The jury may c'onfuse the evidence and apply damaging testimony against the major defendant to convict the minor one. Even
if the jury keeps the evidence separate, it may decide the minor
figure must be. guilty just because of his connection with the
major one. Furthermore, even beyond the risk of confusion and
guilt by association, it seems unfair to compel a minor figure to
undergo the cost and anxiety of defending himself in a major trial,
most of which involves only his codefendants, 97 and which may
unfairly prejudice him.
Although some appellate courts have reversed the conviction
of minor figures involved in major jury trials, 98 others have offered
two justifications for joining the minor figure. First, they say,
94. 336 U.S. 440, 445 (1949).
95. 336 U.S. at 454.
96. One finds statements in appellate opinions that severance is not required merely
because the defendant would have a better chance of acquittal in a separate trial, 8ee 1
C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 443-44.
97. See id.
98. See, e.g., United States v. Mardian, 546 F.2d 973 (D.C. Cir. 1976); United States
v. Donaway, 447 F.2d 940 (9th Cir. 1971); Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo,), cert.
denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973).
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joining a minor figure encourages the prosecution of unimportant
criminals because the prosecutor is likely to dismiss a case
against a minor figure if obtaining a conviction would require the
same dedication of resources as needed to convict a major figure. 99
This may be true in cases where, for example, the minor figure's
case is set first for trial, 100 but it is more likely that a minor figure
will agree to testify for the prosecution in exchange for not being
prosecuted or for a reduced sentence. Second, those courts say, if
the jury is searching for a defendant to acquit, it will surely acquit
the minor figure, even though he might have been convicted if
tried alone. 101 While such acquittal is not inconceivable, it seems
just as likely that the jury will convict in a joint trial the minor
figure whom it might acquit if he were tried separately. And
either way, the joint trial fails to produce an accurate determination of individual guilt.
·
Finally, guilt by association and jury confusion pose especially tricky problems for an appellate court asked to correct unfairness: appellate courts· are not likely to find either type of error
if the jury acquitted at least one of the joined defendants of at
least one charge. The court in such a situation usually holds that
the jury's acquittal demonstrated its ability to give attention to
individual guilt or innocence and to follow the trial court's instructions.102 For obvious administrative reasons, appellate courts
do not ordinarily delve further into the evidentiary record to determine whether the acquittal seems rationally justified or
whether it is itself evidence of jury confusion.

C. The Curative Powers of Jury Instructions
The law, like Justice Reed, 103 assumes that juries are willing
and able to follow the trial court's instructions in deciding
whether the government has proved its case. It is too cynical a
view of jury behavior to assume that a jury deliberately ignores
99. See, e.g., Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985,994 n.21 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 423
U.S. 841 (1974); United States v. Cohen, 145 F.2d 82, 95 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S.
799 (1944).
100. The prosecutor may decide that the danger of revealing his case before trial
outweighs the benefits of convicting a minor figure.
101. See, e.g., United States v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied,
406 U.S. 969, 406 U.S. 975 (1972).
102. See, e.g., United States v. Braasch, 505 F.2d 139, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 421 U.S. 910 (1975), appeal dismissed, 542 F.2d 442 (7th Cir. 1976); United States
v. Hines, 455 F.2d 1317, 1334 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 406 U.S. 969,406 U.S. 975 (1972).
103. See text at note 87 supra.
D
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the court's instructions. Indeed, in other contexts, such as claims
of judicial misconduct, the law assumes that the jury clings to
every word the trial judge speaks and examines the judge's tone
of voice, demeanor, and conduct for hints about the court's view
of the evidence. 104 But assuming jurors want to follow the court's
instructions in a joint trial, can they? The law in many jurisdictions does not help the jury. In federal prosecutions, the trial
judge may charge the jury orally and then refuse to provide it
with a written copy to examine during its deliberations. um In a
case with multiple defendants, complex charges, and lengthy instructions, tµis procedure virtually assures the jury's uncertainty
about the law applicable to the case. In other jurisdictions, the
trial court must not only read the charge to the jury but must also
provide it with a written copy of the charge to take to the jury
room. 106
In jojnt trials, the court's instructions frequently attempt to
compartmentalize the evidence the jury has heard into clusters
that may be considered against each defendant. 107 The jury may
be capable of following these instructions as long as logic does not
require it to apply evidence across the compartmental wall the
trial court has tried to construct. The classic example of attempt104. See, e.g., 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 505 ("The jury is highly sensitive to every
judicial utterance, and the judge's words to the jury carry an authority bordering on the
irrefutable.")
105. Cf. id. at 283. ("In some states the court is required to give the jury a written
copy of his instructions to take to the jury room. This practice is desirable in complex
cases, but it is left to the discretion of the trial judge and it is not error either to give the
jury a copy of the instructions or to refuse to do so." (footnotes omitted)).
,,
106. See TEX. CooE CRIM. PROC. ANN. arts. 36.14, 36.18 (Vernon 1979); note 105
supra. Attorneys can enhance jury comprehension under either system by discussing the
charge in their jury arguments. Counsel are more likely to discuss a written charge than
an oral charge because a written charge will probably have stronger impact on the jury's
deliberations than an oral charge. When the charge is oral and complex, counsel may
tend to ignore the charge in argument, believing that the jury cannot understand it even
with argument. When some judges in jurisdictions with written charges instruct the jury
about deliberation, they suggest that after the jury has selectep a foreman he should
read the charge of the court to the jury before the deliberations begin.
107. Frequently, trial courts also instruct the jury about the limited uses to which
evidence may be put as soon as it is introduced, as well as in the final charge to the jury.
For example, in Linn v. State, 505 P.2d 1270 (Wyo.), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 983 (1973),
three persons were being prosecuted as accessories before the fact to murder. A great part
of the state's case consisted of conversations between two of the defendants. The trial
court instructed the jury at least fifteen times that nothing said in those conversations
was evidence against the defendant who was not present. The instruction was given so
frequently that the trial court abbreviated it to be "the same admonition" or "please
remember the admonition at all times." 505 P.2d at 1273. Although the evidence against
the third defendant was tenuous, the jury convicted. The appellate court reve~sed.
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ing that impossible feat is Delli Paoli v. United States, ws in which
the Supreme Court approved an instruction admonishing the jury
to disregard a statement in a codefendant's confession detailing
the defendant's role in the offense. 109 Although Bruton v. United
States 110 overruled Delli Paoli, for years the law espoused what
thoughtful persons universally agreed was an unmitigated fiction
- that the jury was capable of following such an instruction. 111
Finally, Justice Brennan, writing for the majority in Bruton, acknowledged that at times juries are simply unable to follow instructions:
Not every admission of inadmissible hearsay or other evidence can
be considered to be reversible error unavoidable through limiting
instructions; instances occur in almost every trial where inadmissible evidence creeps in, usually inadvertently . . . . It is not unreasonable to conclude that in many such cases the jury can and will
follow the trial judge's instructions to disregard such information.
Nevertheless, as we recognized in Jackson v. Denno, . . . there are
some contexts in which the risk that the jury will not, or cannot,
follow instructions is so great, and the consequences of failure so
vital to the defendant, that the practical and human limitations
of the jury system cannot be ignored. 112
108. 352 U.S. 232 (1957).
109. Dissenting, Justice Frankfurter noted that the traditional solution to the problem of an extrajudicial confession that incriminates a party on trial with the declarant is
to admit the confession in its entirety and to admonish the jury not to consider it against
anybody except the declarant. "The fact of the matter is that too often such admonition
against misuse is intrinsically ineffective in that the effect of such a nonadmissible declaration cannot be wiped from the brains of the jurors. The admonition therefore becomes
a futile collocation of words and fails of its purpose as a legal protection to defentlants
against whom such a declaration should not tell." 352 U.S. at 247.
110. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). In Bruton, the trial court admitted a confession implicating
a joined defendant. The trial court instructed the jury at the time of the confession's
admission and again during its charge to the jury that the confession was being received
only because it might have a bearing on the declarant's guilt or innoc~nce and that the
jury was not to use it in deciding the defendant's fate. This was the procedure approved
in Delli Paoli. Building upon its holding in Jackson v. Denno, 378 U.S. 368 (1964) (recognizing limits upon a jury's ability to disregard highly incriminating information), the
Court concluded that the risk that the jury had used the codefendant's confession in
determining the defendant's guilt, although prohibited from doing so by the trial court's
instructions, was too great to permit the conviction to stand.
111. The rationally persuasive power of such accusations, and the futility of instructing a jury not to draw the natural inferences from them, is illustrated by Judge Learned
Hand's famous statement in Nash v. United States, 54 F.2d 1006, 1007 (2d Cir.), cert.
denied, 285 U.S. 556 (1932), that the rule "probably furthers, rather than impedes, the
search for truth, and this perhaps excuses the device which satisfies form while it violates
substance; that is, the recommendation to the jury of a mental gymnastic which is beyond,
not only their powers, but anybody's else."
112. 391 U.S. at 135. The Court later made Bruton fully retroactive and applied it to
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Stein v. New York 113 was a second example of asking the jury
to do the impossible. There, the Supreme Court upheld submitting a confession to the jury with instructions that it should determine whether it was voluntary and should disregard it if it was
not voluntarily given. The Court repudiated this position some
years later in Jackson v. Denno 114 because of grave doubts about
whether the jury could perform such tasks. Yet to this day state
judges frequently present admissibility issues to the jury in procedures that closely parallel those in Stein. 115
Bruton and Jackson were major departures from the ironclad
assumption that juries follow instructions, but they did not herald a complete reappraisal of that doctrine. Today some trial
courts still presume that juries can understand and apply extraordinarily complicated instructions in joint trials. 116 Some appellate
state criminal processes. Roberts v. Russel, 392 U.S. 293 (1968). Bruton, however, has been
held inapplicable to jury-waived trials because, at least in the absence of evidence in the
record to the contrary, it is presumed that the trial judge knew his duty to ignore the
accusatory portion of a confession and in fact did so. See, e.g., Cockrell v. Oberhauser,
413 F.2d 256, 258 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 944 (1969). This position has also been
taken in juvenile cases in which the respondent did not have the choice of a jury trial.
See, e.g., In re L.J.W., 370 A.2d 1333, 1336 (D.C. App. 1977).
113. 346 U.S. 156 (1953).
114. 378 U.S. 368 (1964).
115. For example, in Huffman v. State, 450 S.W.2d 858 (Tex. Ct. Crim. App. 1970),
vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 936 (1972), the state called a witness whom the defendant
contended was his common-law wife. Under state law, if the witness and defendant were
married, the witness was not competent to testify against the defendant. The trial court
concluded that the resolution of that question depended upon issues of fact. It submitted
those issues to the jury with instructions that if it found that the witness was married to
the defendant it should disregard all of her damaging testimony. The appeals court approved of this procedure, rejecting the defendant's contention that the trial court should
have itself made the admissibility determinations of fact, that the question should have
been submitted to the jury in the form of special issues, or that the question should have
been submitted to a different jury from the body empaneled to determine guilt or innocence.
. 116. Woodcock v. Amaral, 511 F.2d 985 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 423 U.S. 841
(1975), involved a federal petition for writ of habeas corpus in the Massachusetts small
loans cases described in text at notes 75-84 supra. On the claim of jury confusion, the First
Circuit said,
To charge that the jury would convict the appellant solely on the basis of
evidence which did not directly implicate him is an indictment on the jury system
itself. . • . Whether the jury was able to follow the limiting instructions of the
judge with the precision of a computer is not the relevant inquiry. It is rather
whether the appellant received a fundamentally fair trial in light of the legitimate
interests of the Commonwealth in trying him jointly with his coconspirators. In this
connection we see nothing in the evidence, the number of defendants, or the rulings
of the trial judge which would warrant a conclusion that the sheer complexity of
this trial prevented the jury from appraising the independent evidence against the
appellant and meting out individual justice under the law.
511 F.2d at 995.
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courts conclude that joined defendants -must be presumed to receive a fair trial as long as the trial court instructs the jury about
compartmentalization and mentions that each defendant must
be judged individually. 117 The Fifth Circuit has said:
We concede that joint trials, and especially those involving many
defendants, carry substantial risks of manifest unfairness. At the
same time, it is beyond question that such trials are now an accepted and even necessary aspect of our judicial system. This is
because our system will tolerate· the risk of unfairness so long as
careful efforts are made to ensure that the inequities are kept in
check,11 8

Are the inequities that stem from the complexity of a joint trial
kept in check? In many trials they surely are not. And we have
not yet begun to consider all the particular forms of prejudice that
may afflict a defendant because of the special events that can
happen only in joint trials. Perhaps we should reconsider
whether, in light of the "substantial risks of manifest unfairness,"
joint trials should continue to be thought "an accepted and even
necessary aspect of our j~dicial system."

ill.

COSTS OF JOINT T1mµ,s: CREATION OR AGGRAVATION OF
PARTICULAR PREJUDICES

This Section examines the prejudices that joint trials, when
combined with other factors in a particular case, may create or
aggravate. It principally analyzes foreseeable prejudices that
must be alleged before trial, giving only limited discussion to
unforeseeable prejudices that arise during trial. It concludes that
trial and appellate courts have consistently undervalued the prejudicial effects of joint trials.
"Prejudice" as used here has two distinct meanings. In one
sense it means a condition or event creating a substantial risk
117. See 2 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 339-40. Wright notes:
In cases in which multiple defendants are being tried, particular care is required
in the instructions. If evidence is admitted against one defendant but not against
another, the jury must be instructed about this. . . .
In a conspiracy case against numerous defendants of varying degrees ofinvolvement in the confederation, so that possibilities of injustice to particular individuals
become greater, extraordinary precaution is.required in order that the instructions
shall scrupulously safeguard each defendant individually, as far as possible, from
loss of identity in the mass.
·
[Footnotes omitted.]
118. United States v. McLaurin, 557 F.2d 1064, 1074 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1020 (1977). See also United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120, 136-37 (5th Cir. 1976), cert.
denied, 430 U.S. 956 (1977).
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that the jury will find against a defendant irrationally. For example, a jury may find one defendant guilty because it objects to a
codefendant's criminal record 119 or because it objects to a codefendant's lifestyle. 120 But "prejudice" more often means a condition
or event that unfairly permits a jury to infer guilt quite rationally.
For example, a jury may find both defendants guilty because each
blamed the other for the offense. 121 Either form of prejudice could
justify severance. Nonetheless, appellate courts rarely overturn
trial court refusals to sever:
Joinder of defendants is very frequently prejudicial. Though the
reluctance of courts to grant relief from such prejudice has been
sharply criticized, the usual judicial attitude is that persons jointly
indicted should be tried together except for the most compelling
reasons. . . . The burden is put on the defendants to make a
strong showing of prejudice in order to obtain [relief from prejudicial joinder]. With such a test, it is hardly surprising that in most
cases relief has been denied. 122

This reluctance to grant severance after trial grows in part from
the many procedural difficulties of moving for severance. There
is no good time to assert prejudicial joinder. Asserting it before
trial is speculative; asserting it during trial is disruptive; and
asserting it on appeal invites hindsight deeming the error harmless.123
The most appropriate time to seek severance is before the
trial. Understandably enough, statutes and rules uniformly require that a motion for severance be made before trial unless the
grounds for severance are not then apparent: 124 The current system of liberal joinder would collapse if defendants could sandbag
the prosecution by waiting until the trial begins to reveal known
grounds for severance. But predicting trial prejudice before the
trial begins is guessing at best. A pretrial motion for severance
must show that joinder will harm a defendant during trial, and
119. See text at notes 285-95 infra.
120. See text at notes 296-99 infra.
121. See text at notes 176-98 infra.
122. 1 C. WRIGHT, supra note 9, at 441-42 (footnotes omitted).
123. This point is made in UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 472, Comment at
239 (Approved Draft, 1974):
[I]t is difficult to ascertain the degree of prejudice before trial; once the trial is
under way there is great reluctance to grant a severance and allow some defendants
a fresh start; and on appeal there is even greater reluctance to find the trial judge's
denial of the motion erroneous.
124. FED. R. CRIM. P. 12(b) provides in part: "The following must be raised prior to
trial: . . . (5) Requests for a severance of ..• defendants under Rule 14,"
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it is often impossible to predict such events as a codefendant's
disruptive conduct 125 or flight from the jurisdiction. 126 More commonly, the basis for the claim is known, but the extent of the
prejudice is speculative: it may depend upon defense tactics or
any number of other considerations. Most often, the defense attorney may suspect prejudice from joinder, but be unable to foresee the exact events that will harm his client. Thus, courts often
must dismiss pretrial claims of prejudice because they are too
speculative.
Furthermore, asserting prejud~ce before the trial may be
tactically difficult. The burden of showing grounds for severance
· falls upon the defense, but to assert those grounds in the detail
that courts reasonably require may mean giving away the defendant's case, a· harm that will probably remain even if the court
grants severance. Yet if the court denies the motion, and grounds
for prejudice do emerge, the defendant needs only to show an
appellate court that he raised the issue. Therefore, the defendant,
fearing that the trial judge will not grant severance in any case,
may raise the possibility of prejudice in a pretrial motion but hold
back strategic information so that the judge must deny the motion. The issue is preserved for appeal, but the most economical
opportunity for severance is lost.
The middle of a trial is probably the worst time for a severance motion. It thrusts a difficult decision onto the trial judge, a
decision with no adequate alternatives to choose among. The
impetus for the motion may be a clearly prejudicial event, and
the court will find a mistrial justified. Sometimes a mistrial will
be needed for all defendants; at other times mid-trial severance
of only one defendant will be adequate. Either solution, however,
sacrifices any economies of joinder after the judge has already
endured all the headaches of a joint trial. Even if only one defendant is severed, any efficiencies of trying the remaining defendants together may be offset by an increased risk of reversible
error in administering the trial. Therefore, the trial judge is likely
to refuse severance, sending all cases to the jury with a promise
that he will take a fresh look at the problem if the jury returns
guilty verdicts.
The appellate court confronted with a claim of prejudicial
joinder is often in an even more difficult position. An appellate
125. See text at notes 300-12 infra.
126. See text at notes 300-12 infra.
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judge may feel that, had he faced the question, he would have
granted the pretrial motion to sever; but the law permits reversal
only for abuse of discretion. And more than a legal standard
blocks an appellate judge's path to reversing a decision he disagrees with. Reversal would require retrial of a case that was
originally joined to save the time and resources of multiple trials.
Even if the trial decision were an abuse of discretion, the efficiency questions give the appellate court a strong incentive to
play factfinder and deem the error "harmless." That incentive is
present in all cases, but severance claims on appeal amplify it by
asking the court to review all the evidence and analyze.the effect
of joinder on the entire structure of the trial; most appellate
claims look to the admissibility of only a single piece of evidence.
Not surprisingly, appellate courts regularly find prejudicial joinder to be harmless and profess to be comfortable in doing so.
Because there is no good time or way to sever defendants who
have been joined, the specific and recurring prejudices of joinder
must be considered earlier - when deciding whether joint trials
are appropriate at all. If courts are not able to respond to significant prejudices effectively, any efficiencies of joint trials are
quickly offset. The remainder of this Section investigates those
prejudices and the efforts to mitigate them.

A. Codefendant's Confession Implicates Defendant
One danger peculiar to joint trials is that a codefendant may
confess before trial and accuse another defendant of complicity
in the crime. The prosecution will want to introduce the confession against the confessing codefendant, but the defendant who
did not confess must be protected from prejudice. In Bruton v.
United States 121 the Supreme Court held that admitting a codefendant's confession that implicated another defendant violated
the defendant's right of confrontation. The Court held severance
the most appropriate remedy. Recently, however, the Court has
drawn back from the strict requirements of Bruton, prosecutors
have devised techniques to avoid severance, and the dangers of
prejudice have reappeared. The cases in this area show not only
how insensitive courts are to prejudice arising from joinder, but
also how far they will go to preserve joinder, even in the face of
Supreme Court disapproval.
The most obvious alternative to severance on Bruton grounds
127. 391 U.S. 123 (1968). See text at notes 107-12 supra.
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is for the prosecution to announce that it does not intend to
introduce the offending confession. 128 Although that is a simple,
and realistic, 129 solution to Bruton severance problems, it is not
foolproof, because the prosecutor may not be able to keep his
word. Prosecutors have been known to try to sneak evidence in
even though they indicated at pretrial conference that they would
not. 130 Moreover, a prosecutor can use an accusatory confession at
trial even though it is not introduced into evidence. He might, for
example, threaten a confessing defendant with perjury if he does
not repeat his confession on the stand. 131 Clearly a prosecutor's
promise not to use evidence is a poor substitute for the protection
of Bruton.
·
A second alternative is redaction - deleting the accusatory
portions of the confession while preserving its substance. The
128. As noted in note 124 supra, severance motions must be made before trial if the
grounds are known. Rules of court frequently contemplate that severance motions wili
be based on accusatory confessions of codefendants and provide for litigating that severance ground. For example, Rule 14 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure provides
in part: "In ruling on a motion by a defendant for severance the court may order the
attorney for the government to deliver to the court for inspection in camera any statements
or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in
evidence at the trial."
129. Confessions appear to be most frequently obtained from suspects when other
evidence of guilt is strong. Project, Inte"ogations in New Haven: The Impact of Miranda,
76 YALE L.J. 519 (1967). Refraining from using a confession, therefore, although damaging
to a prosecutor's case, frequently leaves ample evidence of guilt for the jury.
130. For example, in United States v. Taylor, 508 F.2d 761 (5th Cir. 1975), two people
were charged with bank robbery. The defendant moved for severance on Bruton grounds,
and the prosecution countered by saying it did not intend to introduce the codefendant's
third confession, the one incriminating the defendant, in the trial. On that representation
the trial court denied severance. On re-direct examination of a federal agent at the trial,
the prosecutor brought out testimony about the third confession, contending that the
defendant had "opened the door" on cross-examination of the agent. The court of appeals
reversed the conviction on the ground that the defendant's cross-examination had not
opened the door; but the significant point is that the prosecutor was obviously seeking
any opportunity to use the damaging confession he had agreed not to use. See also United
States v. Glover, 506 F.2d 291 (2d Cir. 1974).
131. In People v. Hurst, 396 Mich. 1, 238 N.W.2d 6 (1976), the defendant and his
girlfriend were prosecuted for the homicide of their child. A motion for severance was
made on the ground of antagonistic defenses. The girlfriend had told police the child had
died from a beating by the defendant, while he claimed that the child had died from
falling down a flight of stairs. Severance was denied when the state said it did not intend
to use the mother's statement in the trial. She testified in her own defense in the joint
trial and, on cross-examination, denied that the father had beaten the child with a belt.
Outside the presence of the jury she was confronted with her confession and reminded of
her liability for perjury. In the presence of the jury she then recanted her earlier testimony
and repeated the accusation she had made in her confession. The Michigan Supreme
Court reversed the father's conviction, but on the ground of antagonistic defenses. See text
at notes 176-98 infra for a discussion of antagonistic defenses as a ground for severance.
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prosecutor can then introduce it against the declarant without
violating the confrontation rights of codefendants. Often, of
course, one cannot remove all references to the participation of
another person without materially altering the confession. Such
radical editing could falsely suggest that the declarant admitted
sole culpability for the offense. 132 For that reason, trial courts
ordinarily obscure the identities of other named participants but
permit the jury to hear a confession asserting that others participated. When such limited editing is employed, however, redaction presents a basic problem: Is it really effective, or does it
make a game of the confession, inviting the jury to "fill in the
blank" with the name of the defendant? In many cases, the edited
statement makes it "as clear as pointing and shouting" 133 that the
other defendant on trial is the "another person" 134 or "X" 135
named in the confession. Indeed, some trial courts, perhaps misunderstanding the purpose of Bruton, have as much as instructed
the jury on what name to insert in the blanks. 136 And appellate
courts continue to uphold trial decisions to admit a Bruton confession with what amounts to a sham deletion. 137 It is not surpris132. See, e.g., Matthews v. State, 353 So. 2d 1274 (Fla. App. 1978) (A and B are
charged with aggravated battery by kicking a drunk-tank cellmate; B moves to delete
statement in A's confession that A was wearing tennis shoes, since that would imply that
B inflicted the major injuries); People v. Clark, 42 Ill. App. 3d 472, 355 N.E.2d 619 (1976)
(A, B, and C are prosecuted; A confesses to committing the crime with B but does not
name C); State v. Montgomery, 182 Neb. 737, 157 N.W.2d 196 (1S68) (A confesses to
robbery but claims he was coerced into doing so by B).
133. Harrington v. California, 395 U.S. 250, 253 (1969).
134. State v. Herd, 14 Wash. App. 959, 546 P.2d 1222 (1976), petition for review
denied, 88 Wash. 2d 1005 (1977), held that the accusation relating to "another person"
was ambiguous in light of the facts and that the error, if any, was harmless in light of the
overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt as the second person involved in the
offense. The fll'St of those holdings seems incorrect in light of the facts of the case as stated
by the court in the companion case. See State v. Kimball, 14 Wash. App. 951, 546 P.2d
1217 (1976).
135. Sims v. State, 265 Ind. 647, 358 N.E.2d 746 (1977).
136. In Tate v. State, 556 P.2d 1014 (Okla. Crim. App. 1976), Tate and Biggoose were
tried jointly for J?urglary. A police officer testified that Biggoose told him that "he boosted
me up" to gain entrance into the building. The trial court sustained an objection on
Bruton grounds, but then instructed the jury: "You jurors disregard the statement by the
witness concerning the description of the assistance of the boosting that the witness here
stated Mr. Biggoose said that Mr. Tate gave him. It should be stricken from consideration
when you are determining the issues in this case because I'm ruling that that is inadmissible evidence." 556 P.2d at 1019. Similarly, in Commonwealth v. Nagle, 253 Pa. Super.
Ct. 133, 140, 384 A.2d 1264, 1268 (1978), the trial court literally filled in the blanks for
the jury in its instructions, informing the jury that confessions that name codefendants
are admissible if the names of the codefendants are deleted.
137. See, e.g., United States v. Alvarez, 519 F.2d 1052 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 423 U.S.
914 (1975); State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157 (La. 1976); State v. Herd, 14 Wash. App. 959,
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ing, therefore, that the American Bar Association approves of
redaction only in limited circumstances. 138
A third alternative to severance on Bruton grounds occurs
when the defendant accused in a confession has an opportunity
to cross-examine the confessing codefendant. In Nelson v.
O'Neil, 139 the Supreme Court held that the opportunity for crossexamination preserves the defendant's right of confrontation.
O'Neil had not actually cross-examined his codefendant, 140 and
many courts would not have let him do so, since the codefendant's in-court testimony was not damaging. 141 .Nevertheless, the
Court held that no Bruton error had been committed because
when the codefendant took the stand he became available for
"full and effective" cross-examination. 142
One might wonder whether O'Neil opportunities for cross,.
examination are an adequate substitute for Bruton severance,
which would keep the jury from ever learning of the codefendant's
out-of-court confession at all. If, as in O'Neil, the codefendant
denies the truth of the out-of-court statement or denies making
it, the jury will probably think the denial self-serving and give
greater credence to the confession, including its accusation of the
defendant. Cross-examining such a codefendant would only draw
546 P.2d 1222 (1976), petition for review denied, 88 Wash. 2d 1005 (1977). Alternatively,
courts have held that the deletion was effective and that if it was not, the Bruton error
was harmless in light of the overwhelming evidence of the defendant's guilt. See text at
notes 160-75 infra.
138. The American Bar Association Standards approve of redaction, "provided that,
as deleted, the confession will not prejudice the moving defendant." ABA PROJECT ON
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO JOINDER AND SEVERANCE
§ 2.3(a)(ii) (Supp. 1988). In the Tentative Draft of the same standard, admission of a
confession in a joint trial was approved if "all references to the moving defendant have
been effectively deleted ..•." Id. at § 2.3(a)(ii) (Tent. Draft 1967). The change in
language was made to emphasize the need for caution in redaction. See id. at §§ 3-4
(Supp. 1968). The Comment warns that "courts must exercise great caution in permitting
the prosecution to elect the deletion alternative. • . . In a great many cases the deletion
alternative simply will not be available, as it will be impossible to remove all references
to participation of another person in the crime without changing materially the substance
of the statement." Id.
139. 402 U.S. 622 (1971).
140. O'Neil and Runnels were jointly tried for kidnapping, robbery, and vehicle theft.
In its case in chief, the prosecution presented a police officer's testimony that when
Runnels was arrested he confessed to the offenses and named O'Neil as his confederate.
The trial court instructed the jury that it could consider Runnels's statement only against
him and not against O'Neil. Runnels later testified in his own defense, denied making the
statement, and called it untrue. He then testified to an alibi. On cross-examination he
stuck to his story in every particular. O'Neil then testified to the same alibi.
141. See note 229 infra.
·
14~. 402 U.S. at 626 (quoting from California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970)).
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the jury's attention to the accusatory portion of the out-of-court
statement. 143 If, on the other hand, the codefendant stands by his
out-of-court statement, then the defendant may certainly crossexamine the codefendant. Such a situation pits the defendants
against each other, however, and an increasing number of courts
recognize that sort of antagonism as grounds for severance or
mistrial. 144
O'Neil presents a second problem: in such a situation the
court need not instruct the jury not to consider the codefendant's
statement as evidence against the defendant; 145 indeed, a trial
court would appear, as a matter of federal constitutional law, to
be correct in instructing the jury to give such weight to the accusation as it thinks proper. The prosecutor would also be permitted
to use the out-of-court accusation in argument. In contrast, in a
separate trial, the jury would not ever hear of the codefendant's
confession. Thus, the Supreme Court has allowed "powerfully
incriminating" 146 evidence, often repudiated by its source, to be
admitted against a defendant only because the prosecutor chose
to seek joinder.
In a handful of cases, courts have resorted to more imaginative solutions to Bruton severance problems. For example, in
State v. Johnson, 141 three defendants were charged with capital
murder. Each confessed, naming the others as accomplices.
Simultaneous trials were conducted b.efore three different courts
and juries; each defendant's confession naming the others was
introduced into evidence. but only in his own trial. 148 In United
143. [O]nce Runnels had testified that the statement was false, it could hardly
have profited the respondent for his counsel through cross-examination to try to
shake that testimony. If the jury were to believe that the statement was false as to
Runnels, it could hardly conclude that it was not false as to the respondent as well.
402 U.S. at 629.
144. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 (6th Cir. 1973); Murray v.
State, 628 P.2d 739 (Okla. Crim. App. 1974). See also text at notes 176-98 infra.
146. The jury instruction not to consider the accusation against the nondeclaring
defendant may be required by state hearsay rules even though under O'Neil there is no
confrontation violation. In O'Neil, the Court noted that "Runnels' out-of-court confession
implicating the respondent was hearsay as to the latter, and therefore inadmissible against
him under state evidence law. The trial judge so ruled, and instructed the jury that it must
not consider any part of the statement in deciding whether or not the respondent was
guilty." 402 U.S. at 626.
146. Bruton v. United States, 391 U.S. 123, 136 (1968).
147. 31 Ohio St. 2d 106, 286 N.E.2d 761 (1972). See also State v. Kassow, 28 Ohio
St. 2d 141,277 N.E.2d 436 (1971), vacated and remanded, 408 U.S. 939 (1972) (companion
case).
148. Although the case was in fact severed in Johnson and each defendant was given
a separate trial, the decision to conduct the trials simultaneously and risk confusing the
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States v. Sidman, 149 two defendants were jointly tried, but there
were two juries in the case, one for each defendant. 150 The Bruton
confession of each was introduced while the jury for the codefendant was outside the courtroom. For each case, the charge of the
court and the attorneys' jury arguments were presented while the
other jury was out of the courtroom. 151
In United States v. Crane, 152 three codefendants were
charged with bank robbery, and Crane was charged with possession of the proceeds of that robbery. Crane confessed, naming his
accomplices. To permit the confession to be used against Crane,
the trial court divided the trials. The three robbery codefendants
were tried before a jury, and Crane and his lawyer participated
in the defense. 153 During that trial, two robbery codefendants
participants was apparently intended to minimize burdens on witnesses and to eliminate
the discovery benefits for those defendants not tried first in sequential trials.
149. 470 F.2d 1158 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1127 (1973). ,
150. Each jury was selected separately. One jury sat in the jury box while the other
sat in chairs in front of the box. 470 F.2d at 1168.
151. The jury in one case announced that it had reached a verdict while the other
jury was still deliberating. The trial court ordered the verdict sealed, and it was not
revealed until after the second jury announced that it, too, had reached a verdict. Each
jury found its defendant guilty. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit unenthusiastically endorsed
the trial court's scheme:
While we uphold the use of two juries in this case before us, this should not be taken
as a blanket endorsement by us of such a trial. While it solved part of the Bruton
problem in Sidman's case, it didn't in the Clifford case. . .• The underlying reason
for impaneling two juries, although not expounded by the trial court, was undoubtedly one of economics, that is, conserving the juries' time and costs, the Court's
time, and the witnesses' time, costs and convenience. We agree it was more economical, although the jury fees and expenses would have been the same whether the
trial was joint or separate. There was a saving as to some of the witnesses' time,
convenience and expense; and of course the Judge's time was saved since the joint
trial took four days and separate trials would have taken eight. This was indeed a
saving.
470 F.2d at 1170.
Despite the elaborate precautions against Bruton problems, the conviction of one
defendant, Clifford, was reversed because while both juries were present, a government
witness testified that Sidman had told him that he and Clifford had committed the
robbery. See 470 F.2d at 1170-71.
152. 499 F.2d 1385 (6th Cir.), cert. de11ied, 419 U.S. 1002 (1974).
153. The jury would be required to resolve one question that was common to both
charges - whether a robbery was committed. The dissent noted the problems this caused
for Crane's attorney:
[T]he tandem procedure confused the role of appellant's counsel whose client's
case did not enjoy the fll'St priority on the jury's agenda during the initial phase of
the trial. He might have been reluctant, for fear of antagonizing the jury that had
been told to defer consideration of his client's case, to participate forcefully in the
first phase of the trial, for example, in the examination of witnesses, and in the
decision whether to make an opening statement or "partial" closing argument.
499 F.2d at 13~.
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pleaded guilty, and the third was ac·quitted by the jury. Then
Crane was tried before the same jury on the possession charge,
and his confession was introduced into evidence. The confession
listed those who were to share in the proceeds of the robbery,
including the wife of the codefendant whom the jury had just
acquitted. The majority of the Sixth Circuit, in affirming Crane's
conviction, noted that "[e]ver since Bruton was decided, trial
judges have struggled to find ways that defendants may be tried
jointly even though one has given a statement to the police." 15 ~
While it approved of the bifurcated trial in this case, it expressed
"serious doubts" about its general use to cure Bruton severance
problems. If, for example, the jury returned a verdict of guilty
against the defendant being tried first, "there could be a serious
question whether the same jury .could later give his codefendant
the dispassionate and unprejudiced hearing required by due process and by the sixth amendment." 155 The fact that this jury
acquitted the one defendant whose case was presented to it saved
Crane from that form of prejudice, but a "trial judge cannot
predict at the beginning of the trial what the jury's verdict will
be as to the defendant whose case is first presented." 1• 6 A vigorous
dissent suggested that since the jury was asked to decide whether
a robbery had occurred, a necessary element of the charges
against all four defendants, it would be unable to reexamine that
question when it was deliberating in the second phase of the
trial. 157 Furthermore, the jury in this trial acquitted a defendant
and moments later heard Crane's confession give strong evidence
that it had just acquitted a guilty person: "The jury, having been
told, in effect, that it might have just erred in its earlier verdict,
may have determined not to permit another 'guilty' person to go
free."tss
Even when a trial court clearly violates Bruton by denying
severance, the prejudiced defendant will not always be able to
gain reversal on appeal. As we saw above, 159 appellate courts have
strong policy incentives to uphold lower-court decisions not to
sever; therefore, they have applied their own doctrines to avoid
granting severance on Bruton grounds. First, they have relied
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

499 F.2d at 1387.
499 F .2d at 1388.
499 F.2d at 1388.
See 499 F.2d at 1390.
499 F.2d at 1390.
See text following note 126 supra.
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heavily on the doctrine of harmless error to affirm convictions
obtained in· trials that violated Bruton. In Harrington v.
California, 160 the Supreme Court held that admitting two confessions of codefendants in a joint trial violated Bruton but the error
was harmless because the other evidence for conviction was
"overwhelming." 161 In Harrington and two similar successor
cases, 162 the defendant claiming Bruton error had himself given
the police an inculpatory statement, which had properly been
admitted as evidence against him. 163 The Supreme Court appeared to attach no special weight to that admission, other than
to note the defendant's statement as part of the "overwhelming"
evidence of guilt adduced at trial.
A defendant's confession has, however, suggested a second
ground for avoiding Bruton severance to some courts, particularly
the Second Circuit. To those courts, the rationale underlying
Bruton does not apply when the defendant has himself given an
admissible statement that is "substantially identical" 164 to the
codefendant's accusatory statement. This theory, called "interlocking confessions," holds that when the defendant has confessed to substantially the same facts as those recited in the
accusatory parts of a codefendant's confession and when the defendant's confession is properly admitted into evidence, the codefendant's accusation does not have the "devastating" 165 effect on
160. 395 U.S. 250 (1969).
161. "[T]he case against Harrington was so overwhelming that we conclude that this
violation of Bruton was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt . . . ." 395 U.S. at 254.
162. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427 (1972); Brown v. United States, 411 U.S. 223
(1973).
163. Harrington gave a statement admitting that he was present at the time and
place of the robbery and homicide, but denying that he participated. Although the Supreme Court mentioned Harrington's statement, 395 U.S. at 253-54, no detailed description of it appears in the opinion. The opinion below, however, indicates that the statement
Harrington gave was self-inculpatory. See People v. Bosby, 256 Cal. App. 2d 209, 217, 64
Cal. Rptr. 159, 164 (1967). Schneble made a detailed confession of the murder with which
he was charged. Schneble v. Florida, 405 U.S. 427, 430-31 (1972). Brown also made a
statement which was admitted into evidence against him. Brown v. United States, 411
U.S. 223, 225 (1973).
.
164. The requirement that the statements be only substantially identical was explained in United States ex rel. Stanbridge v. Zelker, 514 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
423 U.S. 872 (1975):
[S]ince confessions are rarely maternal twins, the court must look to their substance to see whether they interlock sufficiently on vital points to indicate a common genesis. If they do, "devastating" effects do not follow from their admission.
514 F.2d at 48-49. The court then examined the two confessions before it, isolated the
differences, and, concluding they were insignificant, applied the interlocking confessions
doctrine to them.
165. The scope of the Bruton decision has been considered by our court on a num-
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defendant's case that concerned the Supreme Court in Bruton.
Using this doctrine, the sole inquiry is into whether the defendant
confessed to substantially the same facts as admitted in the codefendant's statement. Thus, the doctrine avoids a detailed examination of all the other evidence to determine whether the proof
was "overwhelming" under Harrington. Recently, however, several courts have refused to apply the interlocking confession doctrine except as part of a search for independent, overwhelming
evidence of the defendant's guilt. 166 ·
In Parker v. Randolph, 167 the Supreme Court considered
what effect should be given to interlocking confessions in the face
of a claim of a Bruton violation. The three respondents and two
others were jointly tried and convicted of murder. None of the
respondents testified, but the state introduced the oral confession
of each to the events surrounding the killing. Each confession
named others who were present, but the confessions were redacted and .the names were replaced by the words "blank" or
"another person." 168 On federal habeas corpus the district court
and the Sixth Circuit both held that Bruton had been violated
and that the error was not harmless under Harrington. A plurality
of four Justices found, in an opinion by Justice Rehnquist, that
introducing the redacted confessions had not violated the confrontation clause. 169 Justice Blackmun concurred in the judgment
but rejected what he saw as an endorsement of the interlocking
confessions· doctrine. He concurred on the ground that while
Bruton was. violated, the error was harmless under Harrington.
her of .occasions, and we have concluded that error of constitutional dimensions
does not inevitably occur if the questioned confession is admitted under proper
instructions from the court concerning its limited use and purpose. The likelihood
of error must be measured against the prejudicial consequences of the failure of the
jury to follow the court's instructions, i.e., the "devastating" effect of the incrimina•
tions contained in the codefendant's admissions. . . . Where the confession adds
nothing to what is otherwise clearly and properly in the case, it can have little
"devastating" effect.
514 F.2d at 48 (footnote omitted).
166. See, e.g., Hodges v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 909
(1978); State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 578 P.2d 1108 (1978). The Second Circuit itself
has expressed discomfort with the notion of interlocking confessions as an independent
basis for evaluating Bruton claims. See United States ex rel. Ortiz v. Fritz, 476 F,2d 37
(2d Cir. 1973).
167. 99 S.Ct. 2132 (1979).
168. 99 S.Ct. at 2136 n.3. The Supreme Court acknowledged that the redaction ineffectively disguised the identities of the others named. 99 S.Ct. at 2136 n.3.
169. Justice Rehnquist was joined by the Chief Justice and Justices Stewart and
White.
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Three Justices dissented on the ground that Bruton had been
violated and· the Court ought not to reexamine the question of
harmless error in light of the decisions of the two lower federal
courts that the error was not harmless. 170 Thus, a majority of the
Justices could not be assembled either to accept or to reject the
interlocking confessions doctrine.
The remarkable feature of this inconclusive decision is the
effort by Justice Rehnquist to construct an exception to Bruton
that is broader than the interlocking confession exception recognized by some of the lower courts. Choosing to "cast the issue in
a slightly broader form" 171 than the interlocking confession question posed by the State of Tennessee, Justice Rehnquist argued
that Bruton should be inapplicable whenever the defendant has
confessed and the confession is admitted into evidence against
him: "Thus, the incriminating statements of a codefendant will
seldom, if ever, be of the 'devastating' character referred to in
Bruton when the incriminated defendant has admitted his own
guilt." 172 If ever adopted, such a test would eliminate the need to
determine whether the defendant's and codefendant's confessions
interlock and the issue would simply be whether the defendant
had confessed to the offense. If he had, Bruton would not be
violated by admission of the codefendant's statement.
It is, of course, one matter to contend that a defendant's
chances for acquittal are not damaged when a codefendant's confession is added to his own confession to substantially the same
facts. It is quite another, however, to contend that an incriminating out-of-court statement by a codefendant is not damaging
whenever the defendant has made any inculpatory statement of
his own. As Justice Stevens noted in dissent, 173 why should a
defendant's own confession have such a forfeiting effect and not
also other highly probative evidence, such as fingerprints or eyewitness testimony?
Lower courts justifiably perceive the doctrines of harmless
error and interlocking confessions as softening the Bruton standard.174 But where two joined defendants have made confessions
170. Justice Stevens was joined by Justices Brennan and Marshall. Justice Powell did
not participate in the decision.
171. 99 S.Ct. at 2139.
172. 99 S.Ct. at 2139.
173. 99 S.Ct. at 2146.
174. See, e.g., State v. Sullivan, 224 Kan. 110, 113, 578 P.2d 1108, 1113 _(1978) (''The
Bruton rule has been softened somewhat in later cases.").
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incriminating each other that cannot be redacted effectively,
Bruton still requires that neither confession be introduced or that
each defendant receive a separate trial. Even if an appellate court
uses one of the Bruton-weakening doctrines to uphold the result
in a joint trial that admits such confessions, the defendants' confrontation rights have still been undermined. Trial courts should
not accepV75 the recent weakening of Bruton as a repudiation of
the fundamental rights behind that case.

B. Antagonistic Defenses
Joined defendants face the additional risk of antagonistic
defenses: to defend himself properly, one codefendant may have
to produce evidence that incriminates another. The latter can
cross-examine his codefendant on those portions of the testimony
that incriminate him, 176 but he is forced to defend against two
accusers, the government and his codefendant. It also places an
additional burden on the testifying codefendant, who must face
cross-examinations by both the defendant and the prosecutor.
The additional burdens on defendant and codefendant grow
solely from their joinder: in separate trials, each could defend
unhampered by the impact of his defense on the other. 177
An increasing number of courts find joint trials of defendants
with antagonistic defenses unfair. The classic statement of that
view appears in an Illinois case, People v. Braune: 118
175. Hod§es v. Rose, 570 F.2d 643 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 436 U.S. 909 (i978), admonishes trial judges not to guess about harmless error:
[A] trial court cannot decide on the admissibility of a statement under Bruton on
the basis of the strength of the state's case. Rather, the court must decide whether
the statement incriminates the defendant against whom it is inadmissible in such
a way as to create a "substantial risk" that the jury will look to the statement in
deciding on that defendant's guilt. Such an assessment may require consideration
of other evidence in order to determine whether mere deletion of the defendant's
name will be effective in making the statement non-incriminatory as to him. But
consideration of the weight of independent evidence is both improper and unnecessary to determination of the Bruton issue at the trial court level.
570 F.2d at 647 (footnote omitted).
176. Those cases considering whether a Bruton violation is cured when the declarant
testifies are discussed in text at notes 139-46 supra.
177. A defendant intending to testify in his own defense and to incriminate a codefendant would almost certainly claim his privilege against self-incrimination if the government attempted to compel his testimony in a separate trial of the codefendant. Even if
such a defendant were prosecuted and convicted before his codefendant, in most jurisdictions his privilege would remain until the conviction is affirmed on appeal. Only if the
defendant were tried first and acquitted could his testimony incriminating his former
codefendant be compelled consistently with the fifth amendment. See text at notes 26884 infra.
178. 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839 (1936).
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The trial was in many respects more of a contest between the
defendants than between the People and the defendants. It produced a spectacle where the People frequently stood by and witnessed a combat in which the 'defendants attempted to destroy
each other.'79

Another court has noted "There is no more classic situation of the
need for a severance than one in which two co-defendants each
place the blame for a crime on the other." 180 But not all courts
accept that view, as a recent Kentucky case shows:
A good deal of tripe has grown up around the question of what sort
of prejudice should entitle a defendant to a separate trial . . . .
"Prejudiced" means unfairly prejudiced. A defendant is prejudiced, of course, by being tried at all. . . . [N]either antagonistic
defenses nor the fact that the defendant incriminates the othe:
amounts, by itself, to unfair prejudice . . . . That different defendants alleged to have been involved in the same transaction have
conflicting versions of what took place, or the extent to which they •
participated in it, vel non, is a reason for rather than against a joint
trial. If one is lying, it is easier for the truth to be determined if
all are required to be tried together. 181

Courts do not agree on what constitutes an "antagonistic
defense." Courts in the District of Columbia impose what are
probably the most stringent requirements for severance due to
antagonistic defenses. In Rhone v. United States, 182 the District
of Columbia Circuit said:
Prejudice from joinder of defendants may arise in a wide variety of circumstances as, for example, . . . where the defendants
present conflicting and irreconcilable defenses and there is a danger that the jury will unjustifiably infer that this conflict alone
demonstrates that both are guilty . . . .183
179. 363 Ill. at 557, 2 N.E.2d at 842. The Illinois Supreme Court noted in Braune:
It is our belief that no judge, however learned and skillful, could have protected
the defendants in this case against their own hostility. The record shows in many
instances that the defendants' witnesses were subjected to searching and critical
cross-examinations by counsel for the antagonistic co-defendant. Frequently it extended beyond the field covered by the State's attorney and in some cases went into
matters never inquired of by him.
363 Ill. at 556, 2 N.E.2d at 841.
180. State v. Singleton, 352 So. 2d 191, 192 (La. 1977).
181. Ware v. Commonwealth, 537 S.W.2d 174, 176-77 (Ky. 1976) (emphasis in original). Compare the argument that joint trials permit the jury to obtain an "overall view"
of the events charged. See text at note 55 supra.
182. 365 F.2d 980 (D.C. Cir. 1966).
183. 365 F.2d at 981. The court concluded that the mere fact that one defendant
testified while the other did not is not grounds for severance. For a discussion of this
situation, see text at notes 212-54 infra.
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In subsequent cases, the D.C. Circuit has enshrined that statement as its definitive standard. It has refused to find antagonistic
defenses when one defendant attempted to destroy the credibility
of a government eyewitness while the other defendant attempted
to shore up the credibility of that same witness 184 and has said
that the "mere presence of hostility among defendants or the
desire of one to exculpate himself ·by inculpating another" is insufficient .to show prejudice. 185 The Rhone rule is thus designed
to restrict the need for severance to cases where defenses are
directly and mutually antagonistic, and thus very likely to be
prejudicial. 186
Other courts, purportedly taking less stringent postures than
Rhone, have nonetheless read the "antagonistic defenses" doctrine narrowly. Some have concluded that when one defendant
denies participation in an offense while another claims entrapment and admits participation, the defenses are not antagonistic,
even when other testimony links the defendants together. 187 Others have held that where defendants did not directly accuse each
184. United States v. Robinson, 432 F.2d 1348, 1351 (D.C. Cir. 1970). An eyewitness
had identified Robinson, but not Coles, from a photographic array. The court concluded
that all Robinson had shown was that he and Coles had antagonistic strategies - an
insufficient showing to compel severance - and cited Rhone for the proper standard by
which to judge claims of antagonistic defenses.
185. United States v. Ehrlichman, 546 F.2d 910, 929 (D.C. Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1120 (1977) (quoting from United States v. Barber, 442 F.2d 517, 430 (3d Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 846 (1971)). The court concluded that no "irreconcilable inconsistency of defenses" was shown under the Rhone standard. 546 F.2d at 929.
The District of Columbia Court of Appeals has held the Rhone rule governs prose•
cutions of offenses in the Superior Courts of the District. In Clark v. United States, 367
A.2d 148 (D.C. App. 1976), Clark and two codefendants were tried for armed robbery.
Each codefendant testified that he had no prior knowledge of the robbery and that Clark
committed the offense alone. Clark did not testify. The court avoided deciding whether
antagoni~tic defenses under Rhone existed but concluded that "even assuming that there
were antagonistic defenses in this case, appellant has not demonstrated that the conflict
alone created a danger that in a joint trial the jury would unjustifiably infer his guilt."
367 A.2d at 160.
186. There is a danger, for example, that when each defendant testifies and exculpates himself while accusing a codefendant, the jury may automatically conclude that
both are lying when one may be telling the truth. In that circumstance, some courts
characterize the defenses as being "mutually antagonistic" and reverse the conviction ol'
each defendant. People v. Braune, 363 Ill. 551, 2 N.E.2d 839 (1936); People v. Markham,
19 Mich. App. 616, 173 N.W.2d 307 (1969) (convictions not reversed because antagonistic
nature of defenses not disclosed in motion for severance); Murray v. State, 528 P.2d 739
(Okla. Crim. App. 1974).
187. See United States v. Garza, 563 F.2d 1164 (5th Cir.1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1077 (1978); United States v. Morrow, 537 F.2d 120 (5th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 430 U.S.
956 (1977).
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other, the defenses could not be antagonistic. 188 Finally, at least
one court has refused to find antagonism when one defendant
discredited part of a witness's testimony, another part of which
helped a codefendant. The court did not believe that discrediting
part of a witness's testimony might discredit the witness himself
and hence prejudice the codefendant. 189
Under Rhone, defenses must be mutually antagonistic. Several courts, however, have extended their concerns over antagonistic defenses to reach unilateral accusation. 190 Of those courts,
some have limited their concerns exclusively to the injury to the
defendant accused by the testifying codefendant, 191 but others
have widened their focus to include the injury to the testifying
codefendant from facing multiple cross-examiners, each with a
different goal to achieve. 192
188. In State v. Singleton, 352 So. 2d 191 (La. 1977), two ·defendants were charged
with knowing possession of a stolen automobile. Each intended to testify that he did not
know the automobile was stolen because he had been picked up and offered a ride by the
other. The court concluded that inadequate details were provided in support of the motion
for severance and alternatively held that the defenses were not really antagonistic:
Were each defendant claiming that the other knowingly possessed the stolen car,
then their defenses would have been directly accusatory, making each :'defend not
only against the state, but also against his co-defendant" and perhaps requiring a
severance in the interest of justice. . . . Defendants' allegations here, on the other
hand, would neither place guilt directly on the co-defendant nor relieve the asserter
of guilt, for each defendant's acknowledged presence in the car would be some
evidence of guilt of his own possession of the stolen vehicle.
352 So. 2d at 193. See also State v. Edwards, 197 Neb. 354, 248 N.W.2d 775 (1977).
189. In State v. Gaxiola, 550 P.2d 1298 {Utah 1976), two defendants were jointly tried
for murder committed while within a penal institution. Gaxiola's defense was that he
stabbed the deceased in defense of a fellow inmate whom the deceased was attacking. 'l'he
codefendant claimed nonparticipation in the killing. The inmate whom Gaxiola contended
he had been protecting testified under immunity ·and claimed that he had been attacked
by the deceased, that Gaxiola stabbed the deceased and then withdrew from the scene,
and that the codefendant then appeared and also stabbed the deceased. By skillful crossexamination, the codefendant's lawyer discredited the witness's testimony with regard to
his client's participation in the events. Gaxiola contended that the cross-examination
placed him and his codefendant in antagonistic positions. The court concluded, however,
that the "record does not reveal the required opposing hostility in the defenses to support
severance. The defendants here did not protest innocence while accusing the other." 550
P.2d at 1301. See also note 184 supra.
190. See, e.g., United States v. Johnson, 478 F.2d 1129 {5th Cir_. 1973), in which a
codefendant testified that he participated in the offense as a police informer and that the
defendant, who relied upon a defense of mistaken identification, was the culprit. Characterizing the codefendant as the government's "best witness," the court reversed the defendant's conviction while affirming the conviction of the codefendant.
191. See note 190 supra. See also People v. Davis, 43 Ill. App. 3d 603,357 N.E.2d 96
(1976).
192. In State v. Holup, 167 Conn. 240, 355 A.2d 119 (1974), Holup's defense to a
charge of kidnapping was mistaken identification. Codefendant Gordon's defense was that
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Some courts rely on procedurai defaults to avoid dealing with
claims of antagonistic defenses. In addition to requiring a pretrial
motion for severance, 193 courts have insisted that it show details
of likely antagonistic defenses. 194 Although the requirement of
pretrial notice of likely trial unfairness in the form of a motion to
sever serves a legitimate and necessary function, some courts go
further, apparently seeking to avoid facing the underlying issues
on grounds of pro_cedural default. In People v. Markham, 195 for
example, Markham and Rolston were jointly tried for kidnapping. Rolston claimed he committed the offense under Markham's coercion, while Markham offered psychiatric testimony
showing both temporary insanity and a personality disorder that
made it likely he would follow the leadership of an older male
figure, such as Rolston. Rolston's counsel cross-examined the psychiatrist, whose testimony was "substantially undercut by the
codefendant's counsel's extremely able cross-examination." 100
Although Rolston had notified the trial court before trial he would
· consider the psychiatrist's testimony to be antagonistic to his
case, neither attorney had made a motion to sever before trial. 107
The appellate court concluded that "[s]ince the codefendant's
defenses were inconsistent, and in fact antagonistic, had the trial
court been fully advised, and had the defendant asserted this
inconsistency before trial, it might have been an abuse of discretion not to grant separate trials. " 198
Holup coerced him into participating. Characterizing Gordon as the "most effective wit•
ness for the state's case," the court reversed Holup's conviction. Later, in State v. Gordon,
170 Conn. 189,365 A.2d 1056 (1976), Gordon's conviction was reviewed. The court reversed
Gordon's conviction in part because the joint trial "subjected Gordon to cross-examination by Holup's counsel." 170 Conn. at 190, 365 A.2d at 1057.
193. See text at note 124 supra.
194. State v. Jenkins, 340 So. 2d 157, 166 (La. 1976): "Mere allegations by co•
defendants that defenses will be antagonistic do not require the trial judge to sever. Codefendants seeking severance must present convincing evidence to the trial judge of actual
antagonism."
195. 19 Mich. App. 616, 173 N.W.2d 307 (1969).
196. 19 Mich. App. at 634, 173 N.W.2d at 316.
197. Before trial, Rolston's attorney had moved for an order permitting him to interview Markham's psychiatrist. In response, Markham's attorney moved for an order pro•
hibiting Rolston from cross-examining the psychiatrist at trial or, in the alternative, for a
separate trial. The trial court did not rule on Markham's motions, since it viewed them
as conditioned upon the granting.ofRolston's motion to interview the psychiatrist, which
it denied. 19 Mich. App. at 620-21, 173 N.W.2d at 308-09.
198. 19 Mich. App. at 634-35, 173 N.W.2d at 316.
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Conflicts in Trial Strategy

Even if their defenses are not overtly antagonistic, joined
defendants might nevertheless prefer different defense strategies.
They may, for example, differ over theories of jury selection mu or
whether to call a particular witness. A joint trial may prevent one
defendant from using the tactics he prefers, 200 but judicial reluctance to sever has made this an inadequate showing of prejudice
to prevent joinder. 201 Yet the prejudice exists and must be considered when evaluating the wisdom of joint trials.
In Merrill u. State, 202 for example, the defendant sought severance in a pretrial motion because he planned to introduce only
his unsworn statement in his trial defense. Under Georgia law,
such a strategy would have given him the valuable right to make
the concluding argument to the jury. His codefendant, however,
intended to offer evidence, and under Georgia law, if either defendant offered evidence, neither could make the closing argument
to the jury. Thus, joinder effectively transferred the right to argue
last from Merrill to the prosecutor. The court gave short shrift to
the defendant's motion for severance, noting only that the defenses were not antagonistic. 203 Courts have given similar treatment
to claims that joinder was prejudicial because the law prohibited
exercising a peremptory challenge unless all defendants agreed to
199. See notes 45-46 supra and accompanying text.
200. Such problems do not arise, of course, when one attorney represents all of the
defendants in a joint trial. However, conflicts of interest in such representation are inevitable and multiple representation should be on the decline after Holloway v. Arkansas,
435 U.S. 475 (1978).
201. See text at notes 176-98 supra.
202. 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974).
203. The court acknowledged that the right to argue last to the jury is an "important
right" and that denial of that right is ordinarily grounds for reversal. 130 Ga. App. at 749,
204 S.E.2d at 636.
Perhaps because the point may not have been argued, the court did not discuss
whether the nontestifying defendant might retain his right to make the closing argument
to the jury, while at the same time accommodating the government's desire to rebut the
arguments of the testifying codefendants. In Raysor v. State, 272 So. 2d 867 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. 1973), Lester and the brothers Raysor were jointly tried for robbery. Under
Florida law, a defendant who has presented only his own testimony in defense has the right
to argue last to the jury. Since the Raysors presented other evidence, while Lester did not,
the trial court permitted the government to argue last with respect to all three. The court
of appeals reversed Lester's conviction on the ground that the trial court had unnecessarily
deprived him of a valuable procedural right. The court suggested that the following order
of argument would have accommodated the interests of all three defendants and the
government: (1) Lester opens; (2) State argues all three cases; (3) Raysors argue their
cases; (4) State argues again with regard to all defendants; (5) Lester presents the concluding argument. 272 So. 2d at 869.
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it, 204 or that a defendant was unfairly forced to defend in a joint
trial where his attorney and his codefendant's attorney had irreconcilable differences. 205
Special problems arise when one defendant exercises his
sixth amendment right206 to represent himself. Because such a
person, even when assisted by standby counsel, is likely to be
unfamiliar with trial procedures and limitations, he may inadvertently prejudice the other defendants. In one such case, 207
characterized by the appellate court as illustrating that a
"defendant's right to defend a criminal charge pro se . . . may
not be an unmixed blessing in a multi-defendant case even when
assisting counsel is assigned, " 208 the court held that the pro se
defendant's lapses from standard trial procedure,2°0 although
"unfortunate, " 210 did not require reversal of the conviction of a
204. In State v. Persinger, 62 Wash. 2d 362, 382 P.2d 497 (1963), appeal dismissed,
376 U.S. 187 (1964), the court rejected a variety of constitutional attacks upon the Wash•
ington jury-selection procedure, which requires joined defendants to exercise peremptory
challenges jointly. Since counsel for the joined codefendant would not concur in the
defendant's desire to exercise their sixth and final peremptory challenge on a particular
member of the panel, and since the trial court refused defendant's motion that he be
permitted to exercise the challenge individually, the challenge was lost. A similar attack
upon a similar procedure was turned aside in Martin v. State, 262 Ind. 232, 317 N.E.2d
430 (1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 911 (1975). The court did recognize, however, that each
defendant should have the right to show that the requirement of joint exercise of peremptory challenges would be prejudicial in his particular case and, upon such a showing, that
the trial court should apportion the challenges among the defendants for individual exercise.
205. People v. Brown, 27 Ill. App. 3d 569, 327 N.E.2d 51 (1975). A few of the differences: the defendant's counsel wished to try the case on the single point of identity while
the codefendant's counsel planned multiple defenses; the attorneys could not agree on a
single approach to jury selection; the codefendant's lawyer cross-examined the defendant's alibi witnesses, but only on collateral points; during closing arguments, the defendant's lawyer characterized the evidence against the codefendant as overwhelming, while
the codefendant's lawyer disputed this and discussed the strength of the government's
case against the defendant. The defendant claimed further that there was "personal
antagonism" between the attorneys. The appellate court refused to overturn the trial
court's denial of severance, since the defenses (alibi and mistaken identification) were not
inconsistent. 27 Ill. App. 3d at 574, 327 N.E.2d at 54.
206. See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
207. United States v. Sacco, 563 F.2d 552 (2d Cir. 1977), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1039
(1978).
208. 563 F.2d at 555.
209. In his opening statement, Sacco said that a codefendant intended to testify and
briefly outlined the nature of that testimony, but the codefendant changed his mind and
did not testify. See 563 F .2d at 555. Similarly, Sacco commented in his jury argument on
matters not in evidence. See 563 F.2d at 556.
210. 563 F.2d at 555. The court concluded, "Nor do we agree that Sacco's conduct of
his defense was so inept or comments he made in summation so prejudicial as to deprive
Gentile of a fair trial." 563 F.2d at 555 (footnote omitted).
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codefendant. Nevertheless, the court prescribed steps to be taken
by trial courts in the future to minimize the prejudicial effect of
pro se representation on codefendants. 211
Joinder may also distort one of the most important components of trial strategy: a defendant's decision whether to testify. 212
The correctness of that decision may determine acquittal or conviction. Although it is widely assumed that not testifying places
additional burdens upon the defense, 213 testifying is not always
the best course of action. The defendant's demeanor, the credibility of his testimony, or the revelation of prior convictions may
transform him into the government's best witness and ensure
conviction in what would otherwise be a doubtful case. 214
Moreover, the defendant's decision whether to testify will
211. In addition to the steps taken by the trial court in this case (assigning standby
counsel to advise the pro se defendant, holding the pro se defendant to the rules of trial
procedure, cautioning him to '!refrain from speaking in the first person as though he were
testifying, or voicing personal observations in his comments on the evidence," cautioning
the jury when he strayed beyond those bounds, and informing the jury that nothing said
by the lawyers was evidence in the case), the court suggested the following:
[T)o avoid any ambiguity in the jury's mind about the unsworn statements of a
pro se defendant, it should be made clear to the jury at the outset that anything
he says in his "lawyer" role is not evidence against him or a co-defendant, and his
remarks are to be regarded no differently than those of the attorneys in the case.
The pro se defendant should also be specifically instructed beforehand that in any
opening statement or summation he must avoid reference to co-defendants without
prior permission from the court, and should refrain from commenting upon matters
not in evidence or solely within his personal knowledge or belief.
563 F.2d at 556-57 (footnote omitted).
212. As between counsel and the accused, the decision whether to testify is made by
the accused. ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO
THE PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION§ 5.2(a) (Approved Draft, 1971):
Certain decisions relating to the conduct of the case are ultimately for the accused
and others are ultimately for defense counsel. The decisions which are to be made
by the accused after full consultation with counsel are: (i) what plea to enter; (ii) ·
whether to waive jury trial; (iii) whether to testifyin his own behalf.
Standard 5.2(b) states that other decisions "on what witnesses to call, whether and how
to conduct cross-examination, what jurors to accept or strike, what trial motions should
be made, and all other strategic and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the
lawyer after consultation with his client."
213. A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386: "It is widely
agreed among criminal lawyers of experience that the defendant's failure to take the stand
will be construed by the fact finder as an indication that the defendant is hiding something
- hence that he has something to hide."
214. Id. at 1-385:
Obviously, the weaker the prosecution's case, the more difficult is the choice
[whether to put the accused on the stand), since defense testimony may supply
deficiencies in the prosecution's evidence and bolster unconvincing aspects. . ..
[T)he only broad principle that is of much use is that generally no defense is better
than a bad defense - from the point of view both of verdict and of sentence.
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dictate other defensive strategy in a case. Important trial tactics
- jury selection, the opening statement, other defense evidence,
and counsel's argument to the jury - depend to. a large extent
upon whether the defendant testifies. 215 Pretrial matters, such as
what pretrial motions to file, 216 and even defense investigation of
the case, 217 also depend greatly upon whether the defendant plans
to take the stand.
Joinder complicates each defendant's decision. Ideally,
joined defendants·should all make the same decision, thus minimizing the danger of inconsistent defenses and widening the
scope of cooperation in pretrial motions, jury selection, opening
statements, other defensive evidence, and jury argument. There
is, therefore, great pressure on the defense to make an "all or
none" decision about testifying in a joint trial. Often, however,
defendants in a joint trial must go their separate ways on this
pivotal question; when they do, some prejudice is almost inevitable. The diverging strategies may compound other joint trial
harms, for example when the testifying defendant intends to incriminate the nontestifying defendant218 or when the nontestifying defendant would testify for the testifying defendant in a separate trial. 219 In this Section, however, I will limit my analysis to
prejudice beyond the harms discussed elsewhere in this Article.
In Griffin v. California, 220 the Supreme Court held that the
fifth and fourteenth amendments prohibit "either comment by
the prosecution on the accused's silence or instructions by the
court that such silence is evidence of guilt." 221 Comment on a
defendant's assertion of his privilege against self-incrimination
by not testifying "is a penalty . . . for exercising a constitutional
privilege" which "cuts down on the privilege by making its asser215. Id.: "All cross-examination of prosecution witnesses and any opening statement
that defense counsel may have made at the beginning of the case were, of course, designed
to harmonize with the defensive case he has been planning to present."
216. For example, if the defense counsel expects his client to testify, he may wish to
litigate the admissibility of his client's criminal record for impeachment purposes in
advance of trial: Of course, the outcome of such a pretrial motion may have much to do
with whether his client will actually testify.
217. If the accused will testify to an alibi, the defense counsel must direct an immediate investigation, before witnesses disappear and memories fade, in order to secure evidence that will corroborate the defendant's testimony.
218. See text at notes 176-98 supra for a discussion of antagonistic defenses between
joined codefendants.
219. See text at notes 268-84 infra for a discussion of severance to enable one defendant to testify for another.
220. 380 U.S. 609 (1965).
221. 380 U.S. at 615 (footnote omitted).
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tion costly." 222 In response to the argument that the jury will in
any event draw an unfavorable inference from the defendant's
failure to testify, the Court stated, "What the jury may infer,
given no help from the court, is one thing. What it may infer when
the court solemnizes the silence of the accused into evidence
against him is quite another. " 223
The unfavorable inference the jury is likely to draw from a
defendant's silence is a significant defensive problem even in an
individual trial. But when silence is contrasted with testimony by
a codefendant in a joint trial, the jury is more likely to draw that
unfavorable inference and rely on it in reaching a verdict. By
instructing the jury that it may draw no inference from the failure
of one defendant to testify 224 and by instructing the jury on how
to evaluate the codefendant's testimony, 225 the trial court only
highlights the contrast. 226 Despite the silent defendant's efforts to
characterize the trial as solely a test of the government's proof, 22;
the testimony of the codefendant is dramatic evidence to the jury
that at least one party thought the government's case worthy of
response. Why, then, did not the silent defendant offer a defense,
unless he had none to offer? When a jury compares the strategies
in that manner, has not an additional penalty been exacted from
the silent defendant "for exercising a constitutional privilege" 228
because of the fortuity of being jointly tried with a codefendant
who elected to testify?
That burden for the silent defendant often accompanies a
correlative benefit for the testifying codefendant. As long as the
testifying codefel)dant refrains from accusing the silent defendant
of responsibility for the offense, that defendant is unlikely to
cross-examine him. 229 The jury sees him take the witness stand
222. 380 U.S. at 614.
223. 380 u.s·. at 614.
224. Such an instruction may be given over the defendant's objection. Lakeside v.
Oregon, 435· U.S. 333 (1978).
225. See, e.g., the instruction given by the trial court in De Luna v. United States,
308 F.2d 140, 143 (5th Cir. 1962).
226. The charge prohibiting the jury from drawing an adverse inference from the
defendant's failure to testify has been described as "a little like trying to hide an elephant
under a handkerchief." A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386.
227. See generally id. at 1-339.
228. Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609, 614 (1965).
229. Some courts take the position that a defendant's right to cross-examine a codefendant or a codefendant's witnesses exists only to the extent the direct testimony
incriminates the defendant. See, e.g., United States v. Mercks, 304 F.2d 771, 772 (4th Cir.
1962); Eder v. People, 179 Colo. 122, 125, 498 P.2d 945, 946-47 (1974).
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and subject himself to cross-examination by the prosecution, in
stark relief against the defendant who elects to hold his peace. In
closing argument, the attorney for the testifying codefendant will
doubtless underscore the courage and candor of his client in taking the witness stand and enduring a rigorous cross-examination
by the government. 230
Counsel for the testifying codefendant would like to go further in that line of argument: he would rather allude specifically
to the defendant's failure to testify, contrasting it with his client's
action. Sometimes, he would even like to argue that his client has
demonstrated his innocence by testifying, while the defendant
has demonstrated his guilt by keeping silent. Do the principles
of Griffin prohibit him from doing so?
The _leading case discussing this problem is De Luna v.
United States. 231 De Luna and Gomez were jointly tried for federal narcotics offenses. Gomez took the stand and testified that
he was an innocent victim of circumstanc.e and that de Luna was
totally responsible. 232 De Luna did not testify, but his attorney
contended in jury argument that he was being made a scapegoat
and recalled that police witnesses had not corroborated Gomez's
version of the facts. In his jury argument, Gomez's lawyer declaimed: "Well, at least one man was honest enough and had
courage enough to take the stand and subject himself to cross
examination, and tell you the whole story. . . . You haven't
heard a word from this man [de Luna]." 233 De Luna's objections
to this argument were overruled. The trial court instructed the
jury that it could draw no adverse inference from de Luna's failure to testify 234 and also instructed the jury about how to evaluate
230. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971) ("Mr.
Shuford answered questions in a direct, forthright manner without evasion").
231. 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962).
232. He testified that when he and de Luna were riding in Gomez's car, de Luna saw
the police and tossed him a package, telling him to throw it to the ground. Gomez did so,
and when the police recovered the package, it was found to contain narcotics.
233. 308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by the court). Before this comment,
Gomez's lawyer argued that "We know a little something about Adolfo Gomez. We knew
that for fifteen or twenty years, more or less, he has worked day after day at hard labor. I
don't know what this man does for a living. He could have gotten up and told you . ••• "
308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by the court). The trial court overruled de Luna's
objection. Gomez's lawyer then argued, "Now, further, Adolfo Gomez has given you his
version of the facts in this case. He has told you how the narcotics came into his possession. . . . I haven't heard anyone deny that." 308 F.2d at 142 n.1 (emphasis supplied by
the court). Again, an objection was overruled:
234. The court charged the jury:
The defendant Carlos Garza De Luna has not testified in this case. You
are instructed that under the law a defendant in a criminal case may take the stand
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the testimony of Gomez. 235 Gomez was acquitted and de Luna
convicted. The Fifth Circuit reversed de Luna's conviction because of the comments of Gomez's attorney on de Luna's failure
to testify.
Although Judge Bell, concurring specially, believed reversal
was required because the trial court had not sustained de Luna's
objection to the argument and had failed to instruct the jury to
disregard the comments of Gomez's attorney, .the majority went
much further in its analysis. Judge Wisdom, writing for the majority, held that a codefendant's allusion to a defendant's failure
to testify infringes fifth amendment rights as much as if the comment comes from the prosecutor or the trial court. But, the majority noted, counsel for the testifying codefendant may have a duty
to comment on the failure of a joined defendant to testify that
conflicts with the fifth amendment rights of the silent defendant:
These were. not casual or isolated references; they were integral to
Gomez's defense. And considering the case from Gomez's point of
view, his attorneys should be free to draw all rational inferences
from the failure of a codefendant to testify, just as an attorney is
free to comment on the effect of any interested party's failure to
produce material evidence in his possession or to call witnesses
who have knowledge of pertinent facts. Gomez has rights as well
as de Luna, and they should be no less than if he were prosecuted
singly. His right to confrontation allows him to invoke every inference from de Luna's absence from the stand. 236

With that understanding of the rights of the parties, the majority
and testify in his own behalf if he chooses, but the defendant is not required to
testify, and you are charged that the failure of the defendant to take the stand in ·
;> his own behalf in this case will not be considered by you as any evidence at all of
his guilt as to the charge contained in the indictment in this case, and in your
retirement you will not consider or refer to the fact that the defendant did not
testify.
308 F.2d at 143 n.2.
235. The court charged the jury:
The defendant Adolfo 0. Gomez has taken the stand and testified in his own
behalf in this case. A defendant cannot, in a criminal case, be compelled to take
the witness stand and to testify. Whether he testifies or does not testify is a matter
of his own choosing.
When, however, a defendant elects to take the witness stand and testify, then
you have no right to disregard his testimony because he is accused of a crime. When
a defendant does testify, he at once becomes the same as any other witness, and
his credibility is to be tested by and subjected to the same tests as are legally
applied to any other witness.
<J
308 F.2d at 143.
236. 308 F.2d at 143.
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saw only one clear remedy: "If an attorney's duty to his client
should require him to draw the jury's attention to the possible
inference of guilt from a codefendant's silence, the trial judge's
duty is to order that the defendants be tried separately. " 237
Severance does indeed resolve the conflict in duties. Although a defendant has a fifth amendment right not to be called
to give testimony in his own trial, 238 a witness has only a right not
to be compelled to answer incriminating questions. 239 Thus, after
severance, counsel for a defendant could call the former codefendant to the witness stand and require him to claim his privilege
against self-incrimination question by question, for a line of questions, or at least once for all questions, in the presence of the jury.
In argument, counsel could then effectively contrast the witness's
silence with the courage and candor of his testifying client without injuring the silent former codefendant. 240
Severance to avoid the De Luna dilemma fosters two objections: first, that such severance might force a witness to invoke
the fifth amendment before a jury, and second, that such severance might disrupt the criminal justice system. Each objection is
groundless. Some courts hold that a party may not call a witness
whom it knows will claim his fifth amendment right and require
him to make the claim in the presence of the jury. 241 If it is estab237. 308 F.2d at 141.
238. See V. BALL, R. BARNHART, K. BROWN, G. Dix, E. GELHORN, R. MEISENHOLDER,
E. ROBERTS, & J. STRONG, McCORMICK'S HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF EVIDENCE§ 130, at 272
(2d ed. E. McCleary 1972) [hereinafter cited as McCORMICK]:
Basically, the right of an accused is the right not only to avoid giving incriminating responses to inquiries put to him but also to be free from the inquiries
themselves. Thus the privilege of an accused allows him not only to refuse to
0
respond to questions directed at his alleged participation in the offense but also
entitles him not even to be called as a witness at his own trial.
239. Id. § 136.
240. See, e.g., United States v. Bautf~ta, 509 F.2d 675, 678 (9th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 976 (1975):
Taylor, who was in this case in the role of a witness as distinguished from a defendant, could not refuse to take the stand and be examined. His privilege would have
arisen only when the answer to some question asked would have tended to incriminate him, and it would have been for the court to say whether silence was justified.
(Footnotes omitted.)
241. See, e.g., Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 995 (1971); United States v. Marquez, 319 F. Supp. 1016, 1019 n.6 (S.D.N.Y.
1970), affd., 449 F.2d 89 (2d Cir. 1971); State v. Morales, 138 N.J. Super. 225, 229, 350
A.2d 492, 495 (App. Div. 1975); Rodriguez v. State, 513 S.W.2d 594,596 (Tex. Crim. App.
1974). ABA PROJECT ON STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING TO THE
PROSECUTION FUNCTION AND THE DEFENSE FUNCTION § 7.6(c) (Supp. 1971) provides: "A lawyer should not call a witness who he knows will claim a valid privilege not to testify, for
the purpose of impressing upon the jury the fact of the claim of privilege. In some in-
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lished outside the presence of the jury that the witness intends
to invoke his fifth amendment right in response to all or substantially all of the questions that could be asked - which would
surely be true of a former codefendant not yet tried - trial courts
in those jurisdictions would not permit the witness to be called.
Nor would they instruct the jury that the witness claimed the
fifth amendment or give a missing witness instruction. 242 They
usually justify their refusals on the grounds .that the witness's
claim would not assist the defendanes case or·that the jury might
attach too much importance to the claim because of the high
courtroom drama surrounding it. 243
The doctrinal soundness of such decisions is doubtful. They
prohibit defensive tactics that suggest rational inferences to the
jury, do not infringe upon the witness's privilege against selfincrimination, and are arguably protected by the defendant's
right to have compulsory process and to present evidence in his
defense. Unless the testifying defendant can require the former
codefendant to claim his fifth amendment right in front of the
jury in a severed trial, he gained nothing by severing the cases.
Indeed, the testifying defendant lost the natural contrast between
his testimony and the silence of the codefendant, and, on that
score, is worse off after severance than before.
The second objection to the De Luna solution - disruption
of the judicial dockets - was succinctly expressed by Judge Bell:
[S]everance in advance of trial may be required where there is a
representation to the court that one co-defendant does not expect
to take the stand while another or others do expect to testify, and
claim their right to comment upon the failure of the other to testify. This would eliminate joint trials, or vest in a defendant the
right to a mistrial during final arguments, or in the alternative
create b.uilt-in reversible error, all in the discretion of the defendants.244

But Judge Bell's nightmare has not come to pass. Later cases
have quite uniformly limited De Luna to circumstances in which
the defenses of the testifying and ·nontestifying defendants are
antagonistic. 245 As the Fifth Circuit itself explained in Gurleski v.
stances, as defined in the Code of Professional Responsibility, doing so will constitute
unprofessional conduct." See ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY DR 7-102(a)
(8) & DR 7-106(c)(7).
242. See Bowles v. United States, 439 F.2d 536, 542 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied,
415 U.S. 995 (1971).
243. See cases cited in note 241 supra.
244. 308 F.2d 140, 156 (5th Cir. 1962).
245. See, e.g., United States v. De La Cruz Bellinger, 422 F.2d 723, 726-27 (9th Cir.),
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United States: 246 "The De Luna rule applies only when it is counsel's duty to make a comment, and a mere desire to do so will not
support an incursion on a defendant's carefully protected right to
-· silence. Clearly, a duty arises only when the arguments of the codefendants are antagonistic." 247 And yet Gurleski's argument
seems strained. Although comment upon silence is more potent
when the testifying defendant has accused the silent defendant
of responsibility. .for the offense, De Luna, if it is correct at all,
should not be limited to such a situation. The silence of a codefendant compares unfavorably with the testimony of a defendant in any case, whether the defenses are antagonistic or not.
Other courts have narrowed De Luna by limiting what is considered a comment upon silence. Much as courts require that, to be
error, prosecutorial comment upon silence refer only to the defendant's silence, 248 courts have countenanced arguments by counsel
for testifying codefendants that discuss the courage and candor
of their clients in taking the witness stand, 249 as long as they
refrain from comparing that courage and candor directly with the
supposed cowardice and evasiveness of the defendant who remained silent. They have even held direct comparisons cured
when the trial court sustained an objection and instructed the
jury to disregard the argument. 250 If courts continue to eviscerate
De Luna, we may never know if Judge Bell's fears for the judicial
system were justified.
Even apart from the penalty exacted for remaining silent
when a codefendant has testified, the credibility of the codefendant's testimony may vitally affect the silent defendant. If the
codefendant testifies to a defense that includes the silent defendant, such as a joint alibi, then the silent defendant may actually
benefit from a joint trial. If the evidence is credible, the silent
defendant shares its benefit without running the risks of testifying and being cross-examined. On the other hand, if the jury
disbelieves the codefendant's testimony, it is likely to include the
silent defendant within its disbelief and anger. The rights of the
cert. denied, 398 U.S. 942 (1970); United States v. Battaglia, 394 F.2d 304,317 (7th Cir.
1968); Kolod v. United States, 371 F.2d 983 (10th Cir. 1967); Hayes v. United States, 329
F.2d 209, 221-22 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 337 U.S. 980 (1964). The majority position in De
Luna was flatly rejected in United States v. McKinney, 379 F.2d 259, 265 (6th Cir. 1967),
246. 405 F.2d 253 (5th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 977, 981 (1969).
247. 405 F.2d at 265 (emphasis original).
248. See McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 131.
249. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 779 (4th Cir. 1971).
250. See, e.g., United States v. Alpern, 564 F.2d 755, 761-62 (7th Cir. 1977).
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testifying codefendant sharply circumscribe any efforts by the
silent defendant to disavow his' codefendant's testimony. Thus,
the fate of the silent defendant often hinges upon the nature and
quality of his codefendant's testimony, an aspect of the trial almost totally beyond his control.
1n~ United States u. Gambrill, 251 two defendants were jointly
tried for rape. One defendant elected not to testify, but the other
offered testimony that he and the silent defendant were together
elsewhere at the time of the offense. The silent:-defendant, believing that the alibi testimony lacked credibility and damaged his
case, wished to disavow it. Since the testimony was superficially
beneficial to him, the silent defendant could not cross-examine
the codefendant or his witness to impeach them. At the defendant's request, the trial court instructed the jury at the time the
testimony was offered and in its general charge that the alibi
testimony was being offered only on behalf of the testifying codefendant. 252 On appeal from conviction, the D.C. Circuit ordered
severance on the ground that the trial court's instructions had
informed the jury that the silent defendant did not believe the
alibi testimony. Because this message was delivered without
sworn testimony from the silent defendant that would be subject
to cross-examination, the testifying defendant was deprived of his
right to confront witnesses. It would have been permissible, the
court believed, for the silent defendant to have taken the stand
and testified that the alibi evidence was false, but he could not
use the court's instructions to do so. The appellate court also
rejected suggestions that the trial court's procedure would have
been proper if it had included an instruction to the jury not to
draw inferences of falsity from the limiting instruction or if it had
instructed the alibi witnesses to delete all references to the silent
def~ndant in t_h_t:ir t~stimony. 253
The problems posed by Gambrill can only be solved by separate trials. The testifying codefendant's case was damaged by the
instruction that the alibi evidence, although including the silent
defendant, was offered only on behalf of the testifying codefendant. The silent defendant may well have been damaged by alibi
testimony of dubious truthfulness, testimony that increased
251. 449 F.2d 1148 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
252. In its charge, the trial court said, "At the outset I will repeat what I said earlier
at the request of Mr. Gambrill's counsel. That is, that the witnesses called by Mr.
Hunter's attorney are offered on behalf of Mr. Hunter, only." 449 F.2d at 1161 n.50.
253. See 449 F.2d at 1163 n.60.
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rather than decreased the likelihood of a guilty verdict against
both. 254 Yet even under Gambrill, a defendant cannot remain
silent and combat his gratuitous inclusion in the injurious alibi
of another.
Whenever one defendant chooses to testify while another
chooses to remain silent, any adverse inference the jury naturally
draws from silence is heightened by the contrast between the
divergent defense strategies. Some courts may believe that conflicts in defense strategy are inevitable in any multi-defendant
case. 255 For the discerning jurist, however, severance is the obvious and easy solution.
D.

Codefendant Would Testify for Defendant in a Separate
Trial

Joint trials can sometimes produce a converse of antagonistic
defenses that is even more troubling: a codefendant may be willing to testify on behalf of a defendant but refuse to do so in a
joint trial because his testimony may adversely affect his own
defense. In this situation, joinder can preclude a defendant from
presenting testimony that may be crucial to his defense. Some
courts have recognized obtaining the beneficial testimony of a
codefendant as among the most compelling reasons for granting
254. Even when a codefendant presents an alibi that does not include the defendant
within its exculpatory intent, the quality of the codefendant's defense may affect the
defendant. For example, in United States v. De Larosa, 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 927, 405 U.S. 957 (1972), the alibi witnesses of the codefendant were
hostile while testifying and all had criminal records, one for perjury, which were intro•
duced into evidence. During the same trial, codefendant Jones, while testifying in his own
defense, stated that he had first met codefendant Noel in prison. Noel had declined to
testify in order to keep his criminal record from the jury. The appellate court found that
the trial court's instruction to disregard the reference to Noel's imprisonment was sufl1cient to cure the prejudice. 450 F.2d at 1062-63.
255. In State v. Fitzpatrick, _
Mont. - , 569 P.2d 383 (1977), each of four
defendants claimed that joinder denied effective assistance of counsel on the following
grounds: ·
(1) The number of defendants and independent counsel made it impossible to
employ effective trial tactics; (2) one defendant or another disqualified a district
judge or challenged a juror that another defendant would have allowed to remain
in the case; (3) certain counsel delved into areas on cross-examination that merely
repeated the state's case against particular defendants; and (4) all defendants, with
the exception of Radi, elected to rest their cases following the state's case-in-chief,
thus compelling Radi to rest.
__ Mont.at_, 569 P.2d at 393. The court responded to these olaims by stating that
they "could be raised in almost any multiple defendant-counsel proceeding. It would be
most unusual, in our opinion, if four defense counsel representing individual clients did
agree on every question of trial tactics." _
Mont. a t - , 569 P.2d at 393,
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a severance, 256 but other courts have adopted an extremely
cynical position, apparently viewing this ground of severance as
an "alibi-swapping device." 257
It is not surprising that some courts take a cynical attitude.
Severance to obtain a codefendant's testimony will work only in
limited circumstances. Moreover, it presents the court with a
number of difficult problems, beautifully illustrated in the recent
case of United States v. Gay. 258 Dixon, Harris and Gay were indicted for conspiracy to possess heroin with intent to distribute
it and for possession and distribution of heroin. Dixon sought
severance, asserting that if the cases were severed, Harris would
testify that Dixon "was not involved in the narcotic transaction. " 259 Harris confirmed this and asked to be tried first to forestall the admission of his testimony for Dixon at his own trial.
The trial court thought the defendants were "playing games" 260
and offered to sever the cases only on the following conditions:
that Dixon be tried first and that Harris waive his privilege
against self-incrimination at each trial so that if he did not testify
for Dixon the government could call him at Dixon's. trial and so
that in any event the government could call him at his own
trial. 261 Not surprisingly, Harris rejected that offer, and the trial
court denied the motion for severance. The following colloquy
ensued:
MR. SHERMAN [Counsel for Dixon]: Your Honor, may I just
inquire of the Court as to why, if there is a severance, why would
it be necessary for Mr. Harris to have to incriminate himself at his
own trial if he wishes to testify on behalf of the codefendant?
THE COURT: Counsel, I am not going to answer any questions for
you.2e2
After joint trial, all three defendants were convicted and the
256. See, e.g., United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 777 (4th Cir. 1971); Byrd v.
Wainwright, 428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 897
(7th Cir. 1965).
257. State v. Talavera, 243 So. 2d 595,597 (Fla. 1971) (judgment vacated on federal
habeas corpus for failure to provide the defendant an opportunity to show the trial court
constitutional grounds for severance; habeas writ upheld in Talavera v. Wainwright, 468
F.2d 1013 (5th Cir. 1972)). Other courts have expressed great skepticism about the veracity of proffered testimony. See United States v. Rosa, 560 F.2d 149 (3d Cir.), cert. denied,
434 U.S. 862 (1977) (suspicions aroused by timing of the motion for severance and familial
relationship of codefendant to defendant).
258. 567 F.2d 916 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. 999 (1978).
259. 567 F.2d at 917 n.1.
260. 567 F.2d at 923.
261. See 567 F.2d at 917, 922.
262. 567 F.2d at 923.
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convictions were affirmed by the Ninth Circuit. The appellate
court characterized Harris's offer to testify for Dixon if he were
tried first as conditional263 and held that the trial court was within
the bounds of discretion in denying it on that ground. The appellate court doubted whether Harris could be forced to waive his
privilege against ·self-incrimination as a price of severance, 20 ~ but
it did not doubt the propriety of the trial court's ruling that
Dixon, not Harris, would be tried first. Although it would appear
that the trial court's insistence that Dixon be tried first was intended to preclude Harris from testifying, 265 the appellate court
held that the trial court's action was in fact designed to ensure
that "the separate trials would be scheduled and conducted
under the same rules and with the same consequences as if the
defendants had been separately indicted." 266
Gay reveals the many considerations that a trial court must
bear in mind when faced with a motion for severance to obtain a
codefendant's testimony. First, no matter how critical the testimony, a defendant cannot violate a codefendant's privilege
against self-incrimination. 267 He may not compel a codefendant
to testify in a joint trial; 268 he may not even call the codefendant
as a witness and force him to plead the fifth amendment before
the jury. 269 A defendant may not comment upon a codefendant's
failure to take the stand in a joint trial. 270 As long as they are
263. 567 F.2d at 917. The offer to testify for Dixon was, of course, conditioned upon
Harris being tried first. Presumably, -all such offers to testify are so conditioned because
if the codefendant were willing to testify for another before his own case was tried, that
would be tantamount to testifying in his own trial. The court's action in disqualifying the
motion for severance on the ground that the offer to testify was conditional was based upon
United States v. Rice, 550 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 954 (1977). Rice is,
however, distinguishable in that the Fifth Circuit in that case interpreted the offer to
testify to mean that "[w]hatever the testimony, it was contingent upon Alvarez not being
required to testify to anything which might tend to incriminate him." 550 F.2d at 1370.
Such an offer is much more limited than one which merely seeks to have the offerer tried
first.
264. See 567 F.2d at 917-18 n.2.
265. There is, for example, no indication that the attorney for the government had
any legitimate preference about who should be tried first if a severance were granted to
enable Dixon to obtain the testimony of Harris.
266. 567 F.2d at 920.
267. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 141.
268. McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 130.
269. See, e.g., Coleman v. United States, 420 F.2d 616 (D.C. Cir. 1969); United States
v. Carella, 411 F.2d 729 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 396 U.S. 860 (1969).
270. Although such a prohibition would seem compelled by the principle of Griffin
v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965), the question is somewhat clouded by De Luna v. United
States, 308 F.2d 140 (5th Cir. 1962). De Luna is discussed in text at notes 231-50 supra.
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joined for trial, the codefendant alone decides whether he will
testify. Of course, he will rarely testify in a joint trial if testifying
harms his own interests - altruism does not typify the behavior
of criminal defendants. And there are many good reasons not to
testify. Truthful testimony might assure conviction. Even if the
testimony would help his cause, a codefendant might prefer that
the jury not learn of his criminal record. He might simply be too
nervous or inarticulate to make a good witness. 271 Thus, joinder
often guarantees that a defendant will not be able to use a codefendant's testimony in fashioning his defense.
Second, the codefendant with helpful testimony must be
tried first if severance is to offer any improvement. 272 Otherwise,
his testimony could be used against him, even if he does not
testify at his own trial, 273 and he would be just as unwilling to help
his comrade as if the cases were still joined.274 Even after being
tried first, a codefendant may feel uncomfortable testifying, perhaps because he fears additional charges or because he hopes for
a new trial. If his concerns are realistic, ,his privilege against selfincrimination still protects him; he may decide to waive whatever
remains of his privilege, 275 but he may renege on his earlier offer
271. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-386 to -392 for a
brief discussion of the considerations that should inform the decision whether to put a
defendant on the witness stand.
272. See 567 F.2d at 920.
273. McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 132.
274. Some courts, in affirming denials of severance, express doubt about whether
severance would have been efficacious, in view of the uncertainty about whether the
codefendant would be tried first, ignoring the obvious truth that the same considerations
that require severance also reqiiire an order that the codefendant be tried first. See, e.g.,
United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517,524 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985,431 U.S.
923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977): "Severance of Muhammad would not automatically have created
an environment in which his codefendants could have testified without waiving their Fifth
Amendment rights. If Muhammad had been severed and tried first, his codefendants
would have had to waive their Fifth Amendment rights in order to testify on his behalf."
When appellate courts hold that trial courts have abused discretion in not granting
severance in this situation, they usually do no more than suggest that it might be appropriate to set the cases of the testifying codefendants first. See, e.g., Byrd v. Wainwright,
428 F.2d 1017 (5th Cir. 1970); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892, 898 (7th Cir. 1965):
"[W]e do not feel it would have been egregious had the trial judge, after granting the
motion for separate trial, also directed the Government to proceed first with the case
against Arrington." Admittedly, order~of-trial problems can become quite complicated
when more than one defendant wishes to call a codefendant as a defense witness. See
United States v. Finkelstein, 526 F.2d 517, 523-25 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
960 (1976).
275. For example, in United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965), an
attorney, Echeles, and his former client, Arrington, were indicted for suborning perjury
and perjury respectively. Arrington had stated three times in his earlier criminal proceed-
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instead. 276 The court, therefore, must assess the likelihood that
the codefendant will actually testify when the smoke has cleared.
Numerous motions for severance have been denied because the
trial court was not persuaded that the codefendant would in fact
testify when called upon to do so. 277
Third, the codefendant may be unwilling, for tactical reasons, to reveal the nature of his testimony. Occasionally, prior
proceedings may reveal a codefendant's testimony, 278 but when
they do not, trial courts quite properly insist upon more than
affidavits that merely promise exculpatory or beneficial testimony.279 The codefendant, on the other hand, has no desire to give
ings that Echeles had not advised him to commit perjury. After holding that severance
should have been granted and that the trial court could have directed the government to
try Arrington first, the court addressed the concern that there would still be no guarantee
that Arrington would testify for Echeles:
Speculation about what Arrington might do at a later Echeles trial undoubtedly
would be a matter of some concern to Echeles, but he should not be foreclosed of
the possibility that Arrington would testify in his behalf merely because that eventuality was not a certainty. . . . Moreover, it would in fact seem more likely than
not that Arrington would have testified for Echeles for the reason that three times
previously, in open court, Arrington had voluntarily exculpated Echeles, apparently contrary to his own penal interest.
352 F.2d at 898.
276. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 139.
277. See, e.g., United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141 (9th Cir. 1971), cert. denied,
405 U.S. 1069 (1972); United States v. Kilgore, 403 F.2d 627 (4th Cir. 1968), cert. denied,
394 U.S. 932 (1969). If the appellate court is persuaded that the testimony sought is
important to the moving party, it will require severance even if there is no guarantee that
the testimony will be forthcoming. United States v. Shuford, 454 F.2d 772, 778 (4th Cir.
1971):
This is not to say that it is beyond question that Jordan's testiniony would be
forthcoming after severance. The movant is not put to such stringent proof. A
reasonable probability appearing that the proffered testimony would, in fact, materialize, Shuford should not have been foreclosed from the benefits of Jordan's
pivotal testimony simply because that probability was not an absolute certainty.
278. See United States v. Starr, 584 F.2d 235 (8th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S.
1115 (1979); United States v. Echeles, 352 F.2d 892 (7th Cir. 1965). See also State v.
Alford, 289 N.C. 372, 222 S.E.2d 222 (codefendant had confessed to the offense and named
one other than defendant as his partner), vacated and remanded, 429 U.S. 809 (1976).
279. In United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985,
431 U.S. 923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977), four codefendants of defendant Muhammad offered to
testify for him but only in a severed trial. When asked about the nature of the testimony
that would be given, each claimed the fifth amendment. Denial of severance was upheld
on appeal. Although other factors were involved, the appellate court emphasized the
undisclosed nature of the offered testimony:
The trial court was, accordingly, asked to take the extreme step of severing Muhammad without any knowledge of the nature or extent of purportedly exculpatory
evidence and without any indications that co-defendants would in fact be willing
to offer such evidence in the event of severance. The bald and conclusory assertions
of Muhammad's co-defendants that they possessed potentially exculpatory evi-
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away either his own case or the defendant's. This stalemate may
be resolved by permitting a codefendant to disclose the testimony
he would present on behalf of another in chambers, without revealing it to the prosecutor. 280 The proffer could be sealed in the
record to permit full appellate review of the trial court's ruling on
the motion for severance. Under such a procedure, trial courts
could preview the offered testimony before deciding whether to
' grant severance, without disclosing the testimony prematurely.
Assuming the trial court has some idea of what the testimony
will be, a fourth determination remains: how important is the
testimony to the defendant's case? If the testimony .would provide
the only defense in the case, the analysis is easy. Usually, however, the court must make a more difficult judgment. In making
this judgment, courts have usually asked the wrong questions.
They ask, for example, whether the testimony exculpates the
defendant or "merely" impeaches a government witness, 281
whether the testimony is the only evidence of a fact or "merely"
corroborates other defense evidence. 282 Courts legitimately want
not to order severance when the codefendant's testimony is too
weak to warrant it, but the strength of evidence is not determined
by whether it is exculpatory rather than impeaching, unique
rather than corroborative. Consider a very typical case: The defendant's own testimony is not enough to avert a guilty verdict;
without anything to impeach the government witness, the defendant would lose; but when the codefendant "merely" corroborates the defendant's alibi283 and "merely" impeaches the governdence did not provide adequate grounds for pre-trial severance in this multidefendant trial.
549 F.2d at 524.
280. See, e.g., FED. R. CRIM. P. 14, which provides in part: "In ruling on a motion by
a defendant for severance the court may order the attorney for the government to deliver
to the court for inspection in camera any statements or confessions made by the defendants which the government intends to introduce in evidence at the trial." This would
prevent disclosure to the nondeclarant defendants, who would otherwise have no right to
discover it. See FED. R. CruM. P. 16.
281. See, e.g., United States v. Abraham, 541 F.2d 1234 (7th Cir. 1976), cert. denied,
429 U.S. 1102 (1977); Jackson v. United States, 329 A.2d 782, 788 (D.C. App.' 1974).
282. United States v. Jackson, 549 F.2d 517,525 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 430 U.S. 985,
431 U.S. 923, 431 U.S. 968 (1977); United States v. Thomas, 453 F.2d 141, 144 (9th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 1069 (1972). See also United States v. Gay, 567 F.2d 916,
921 n.7 (9th Cir.), cert. denied, 435 U.S. '999 (1978).
283. See A. AMSTERDAM, B. SEGAL & M. MILLER, supra note 26, at 1-396:
It is vital to corroborate the defendant on every point on which corroboration is
possible. Nothing should be left to rest on the defendant's unsupported testimony
if there is any extrinsic proof of substance to support it. . . . Every matter in which
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nient witness's motive by testifying to a prior inconsistent statement, the jury quickly accepts the defendant's arguments. Courts
must look to what difference particular testimony makes, not to
whether it is independently conclusive.
Severance to obtain a codefendant's testimony poses greater
potential disruption of the trial process than other grounds of
severance. Sevc0rance on this ground deals with whether the defendant will be able to present defense evidence to the trier of
fact, and thus affects nonjury as well as jury trials. Further it
requires an order that the codefendant be tried first. Because
severance is granted to permit testimony in the second of the
severed cases, two trials are likely, rather than one trial followed
by nontrial disposition of the other. 284
Balanced against those considerations, however, is the possibility that a joint trial will preclude an effective defense. If severance is denied, that decision may contribute to the conviction of
an innocent person. For that reason alone, this ground of severance should command the most sympathetic attention of the trial
courts.

E. Codefendant's Criminal Record
Another danger of joinder is that a defendant may be prejudiced by his codefendant's criminal record. A defendant's record
of convictions is ordinarily not admissible against him because of
his right to be tried on the offense charged and not on his criminal
background. 285 There are, however, numerous exceptions to this
prohibition, and a defendant's record is often admitted for limited purposes. 286 The jury is instructed about the limited use to
he is supported by proof that the trier of fact is likely to believe has a capacity to
spread and envelop his testimony with an atmosphere of veracity. He needs this
badly, since his testimony is suspect for obvious self-interest.
284. See text at notes 37-40 supra.
285. See generally McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 190.
286. Evidence of a criminal conviction may be admissible because it is an element
of the offense charged. For example, driving while intoxicated by one who has previously
been convicted of that offense is frequently made a felony. See, e.g., TEx. STAT. ANN, art.
67011-2 (Vernon 1977). To prove its charge under such a statute, the prosecution must
prove the earlier conviction and the current incident.
A defendant's record may also be used as predisposition evidence when entrapment
is raised. If the defendant has been convicted of a similar offense, it is less likely that he
was an innocent person entrapped by the creative activity of a government agent. See
Sherman v. United States, 356 U.S. 369, 375 (1958); Sorrells v. United States, 287 U.S.
435, 451 (1932).
A record may be admitted to determine the credibility of the defendant's testimony.
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which it is supposed to put the record, but some jurors may consider earlier convictions as evidence of the defendant's criminal
propensities and convict him accordingly. Joinder exacerbates
this problem because evidence of a codefendant's record may
reflect prejudicially on the other defendant.
On the one hand, the jury may favor a defendant when it
learns of a codefendant's earlier conviction but not of the defendant's. It might assume (perhaps erroneously) that the defendant
must not have a record, and acquit him. On the other hand, the
codefendant's record might unfairly prejudice the defendant. To
the extent the defenses of the defendant and the codefendant
interlock, the defendant's case may fall with the codefendant's.
The jury might also disbelieve a defendant's contention of innocence because of his association with someone with a record, tarring both defendants as "birds of a feather." Finally, if the evidence against each is similar enough to warrant identical treatment of the parties, the jury may convict one defendant only to
avoid acquitting a codefendant with a record.
This type of prejudice has aroused the concern of some
states. A Texas statute, for example, mandates severance if one
defendant has an admissible conviction and the other does not. 287
Kentucky courts recognize a presumption of prejudice from joinder of a defendant with a codefendant who is charged under the
habitual offender law. 288 But most states approach the problem
on an ad hoc basis and require the defendant to show actual
prejudice before compelling severance. For example, in Davis v.
Ordinarily, the conviction must be for a felony or for certain misdemeanors, such as those
involving "moral turpitude" or "dishonesty or false statement." See FED. R. Evm. 609. A
defendant's record may also be used to enhance punishment under a habitual offender
statute. See, e.g., Spencer v. Texas, 385 U.S. 554 (1967).
287. TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN art. 36.09 (Vernon Supp.1978) provides in part that
"in cases in which, upon timely motion to sever, and evidence introduced thereon, it is
made kriown to the court that there is a previous admissible conviction against one
defendant . . . the court shall order a severance. . . ." This provision has been interpreted to require proof that one defendant has a prior conviction admissible in evidence
while the moving defendant has no prior admissible conviction. See, e.g., Robinson v.
State, 449 S.W.2d 239, 240 (Tex. Crim. App. 1969).
288. In Hardin v. Commonwealth, 437 S.W.2d 931, 933 (Ky. Ct. App.1968), the court
concluded that joinder "for trial with a defendant being tried under the habitual criminal
statute is inherently prejudicial to a defendant who is not accused under that statute."
In Jones v. Commonwealth, 457 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Ky. Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 401
U.S. 946 (1971), the court interpreted its earlier statement in Hardin to establish merely
a presumption of prejudice that could be overcome by evidence, and it indicated that the
trial court's denial of a motion for severance in the absence of contrary evidence could,
on appeal, be harmless error.
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State, 289 the defendant was indicted for auto theft with a codefendant who was alleged in the same indictment to have four prior
convictions of auto theft. The trial court denied severance. Although the entire indictment, including the allegations of the
codefendant's convictions, was read to the jury when the trial
began, 290 the appellate court affirmed the conviction because the
defendant could specify no particular prejudice from the procedure. As long as an appellate court can conceive of a trial that
does not prejudice the defendant, it seems unlikely that he will
prevail in many jurisdictions without direct proof of prejudice.
Curiously, however, when the codefendant's record is improperly revealed to the jury, some courts are quick to find that
action also prejudicial to the defendant. But to the defendant, an
improper admission is no more damaging than a proper one. In
People v. Shuler, 291 for example, the jury incorrectly learned of a
codefendant's earlier murder conviction. In reversing the defendant's conviction, the court commented: "The evidence against
both defendants was almost identical, and the only logical verdict
would have been a conviction of both defendants or an acquittal
of both of them." 292 In a similar case, People v. Watson, 203 the
court, in reversing the conviction of a defendant because testimony of a previous arrest was improperly admitted against a
codefendant, commented:
The two men were being tried together for one criminal act. In the
minds of the jurors, the two men must have appeared as a single
unit. . . . When the jury discovered that Harris had an arrest
record, it is reasonable to conclude that this fact tainted its view
of Watson. It is a simple matter of "guilt by association." 20~

In each case the appellate court had earlier reversed the convic-

tion of the codefendant295 and may have believed that justice
between the defendants required it also to reverse the conviction
of the defendant. Yet the court surely would not have done so
unless it felt that the codefendant's record had prejudiced the
defendant. Courts should recognize that the damage to the defen289. 129 Ga. App. 796, 201 S.E.2d 345 (1973).
290. 129 Ga. App. at 796, 201 S.E.2d at 346 (syllabus by the court).
291. 55 App. Div. 2d 609, 389 N.Y.S:2d 383 (1976).
292. 55 App. Div. 2d at 609, 389 N.Y.S.2d at 383.
293. 55 App. Div. 2d 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d 116 (1977).
294. 55 App. Div. 2d at 873, 390 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
295. Shuler's codefendant's conviction was reversed in People v. Gardella, 55 App.
Div. 2d 607, 389 N.Y.S.2d 118 (1976), and Watson's in People v. Harris, 52 App. Div. 2d
560, 382 N.Y.S.2d 322 (1976).
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dant is not less great when the codefendant's record is properly
admitted, and should sever all defendants when one has a record
that is admissible at trial.
F. Lifestyle of Codefendant or Codefendant's Counsel
Joinder may place a defendant on trial with a codefendant
whose way of living, manner of dress, or philosophy of existence
offends some members of the jury. The jury may express its displeasure with an unfavorable verdict, and may spill some of its
disfavor onto the defendant. Ordinarily this is not grounds for
severance, but it is still a factor to be considered when evaluating
the soundness of joinder as a judicial institution. In United States
v. De Larosa, 296 three of the four defendants prosecuted jointly
for bank robbery claimed prejudice to their cases on the ground
that the fourth defendant wore clothes commonly associated with
"Black Militants" and used a name also associated with that
group. The court rejected the claim, commenting, "Severance
was not required by the unfavorable impression which may have
been created by [the fourth defendant's] identification with an
unpopular social and political group." 297 In Merrill v. State, 298 the
defendant, charged with possession of marijuana, moved for severance on the ground that while he and his attorney were clean
shaven, both codefendant and his attorney exhibited full, long
beards and long hair in an unkempt state. The court let this claim
pass with the comment that it was a "cosmetic handicap." 299
But although severance is not always appropriate in these
cases, such factors as appearance or lifestyle nevertheless do affect jury deliberations, despite efforts to neutralize them. It is one
thing for prejudice of this sort to influence the decision of the jury
296. 450 F.2d 1057 (3d Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 927, 405 U.S. 957 (1972).
297. 450 F.2d at 1065. The fourth defendant's participation introduced other risks of
prejudice. His alibi witnesses all had criminal records, which were revealed to the jury,
and one had previously been convicted of perjury. They were also described as "hostile"
witnesses. Furthermore, some physical evidence was relevant only to the fourth defendant's participation in the offense, but was admitted and was argued by the prosecutor
to corroborate the accomplice's testimony as to the guilt of all four.
298. 130 Ga. App. 745, 204 S.E.2d 632 (1974).
299. 130 Ga. App. at 748, 204 S.E.2d at 636. There was an additional ground for
severance. The defendant's motion stated that he intended only to introduce his unswom
statement in defense while his codefendant intended to introduce testimony. Under Georgia law, had the defendant been tried separately, his counsel would have been given the
right to make the final argument to the jury because no testimony was offered in defense,
but if the codefendant testified, then both defendants would forfeit this right. The court
also rejected this contention.
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as to the person against whom the bias is directed, but it is quite
another, more serious matter if the prejudice taints one who is
merely joined for trial with that person. Courts should, therefore,
guard against this type of prejudice by severing defendants where
necessary.
G. Trial Occurrences That Cannot Be Reasonably Anticipated

Special problems arise when grounds for prejudice unexpectedly emerge after a joint trial is underway. Most types of prejudice - such as those already discussed - can usually be anticipated and raised in a pretrial motion for severance. 300 No pretrial
planning can prepare a defendant for the unexpected actions of
his codefendants. A codefendant may plead guilty during the
trial. A codefendant may flee. Or a codefendant may disrupt a
trial with his behavior. In all these cases, the remaining defendants must face a jury that already has something to hold against
one defendant; the danger in a joirit trial is that the jury will use
this prejudice to convict another defendant who had no control
over his codefendant's actions. A jury may reason, for example,
that if a codefendant flees during the trial he is guilty. From this
conclusion, it may reason that defendants joined with the one
who fled are guilty, too. Similarly, a jury whose patience has been
severely tried by a disruptive defendant may express its displeasure by convicting all the codefendants. Courts try to overcome
this prejudice with remedial instruction, but often severance is
the only workable solution.
United States v. Beasley 301 illustrates the p,roblem. Beasley
was tried jointly with several other defendants for income tax
evasion. During the trial, all Beasley's codefendants pleaded
guilty, leaving him to face the jury alone. The trial judge did not
explain to the jury why some defendants were periodically disappearing from the defense counsel's tables, and Beasley did not
request any such explanation. On appeal, however, he urged that
the court's failure to explain was plain error. 302 The appellate
court recognized that the jury might guess that the other defendants had pleaded guilty and therefore assume that Beasley was
also guilty. 303 Nevertheless, it ruled that an explanatory instruc300. FED. R. CruM. P. 12(b) provides in part: "The following must be raised prior to
trial: . . . (5) Requests for a severance of . . . defendants under Rule 14."
301. 519 F.2d 233 (5th Cir. 1975), vacated and remanded, 425 U.S. 956 (1976).
302. See FED. R. CruM. P. 52(b).
303. The court stated that, "the strong probability of prejudice to Beasley emanating
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tion304 was not necessary since the remaining defendants had not
asked for it. 305 The court's belief that an explanatory instruction
would cure the prejudice 306 seems unjustified: by settling the
jury's doubts about the fate of the other defendants, it could
harm the defendant just as easily as it could help him. The prejudice in Beasley would persist with or without an instruction. The
court's opinion seems particularly strange because the same court
has reversed convictions of defendants where a codefendant
pleaded guilty before the trial and the trial court instructed the
jury of the plea and that it should not be considered as evidence
from the guilty pleas of all three of his codefendants cast a substantial shadow on the
fairness of the trial proceedings." 519 F.2d at 238. Further,
This was a lengthy trial. As the evidence before the jury mounted, defendants began
to disappear without explanation. It is possible that some jurors may have attributed their absences to dismissal, severance, mistrial, illness or some condition short
of confessed guilt. • . . It is . . • equally possible that the jury surmised that pleas
of guilty caused the disappearance of Matthews, Wilson and Finley. If this is what
they thought, did it affect their weighing of Beasley's guilt?
519 F.2d at 239. Finally, the defendants were charged with conspiracy and
the crime of conspiracy by its very nature may lend itself to an improper jury
finding of guilt by association with those found to be participants in the conspiracy
rather than the required finding of guilt based upon proof beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant participated in the conspiracy. This danger of transferred
guilt is acute in this case where the evidence against the sole remaining defendant
repeatedly refers to his relationship with persons who have suddenly and unexplainedly disappeared from the trial.
519 F.2d at 239.
304. The instruction in question is one "advising the jury that a codefendant has
pleaded guilty coupled with an instruction that such plea cannot be considered as evidence of the guilt of the remaining defendant." 519 F.2d at 239.
305. The appellate court speculated that an explanatory instruction may not have
been requested by Beasley's counsel for tactical reasons, believing that "to emphasize the
admitted guilt of those others named in the indictment would have been even more
prejudicial" than to permit the jury to speculate about the fates of the former codefendants. 519 F.2d at 240.
The appellate court did not consider what the trial court should do when one of the
remaining defendants requests the instruction while another objects to it. Presumably, the
trial court must give the instruction. If so, then the tactical decision of the attorney who
does not wish the instruction, which the court acknowledged was a realistic and legitimate ,
consideration in the context of its plain error discussions, is overridden by the wishes of a
codefendant who, for whatever reason, views the tactical situation differently. Of course,'
once the trial court has been required to make the instruction, it must encompass all
remaining defendants, or else the jury is invited to make a totally irrational judgment that
the plea is evidence of one codefendant's guilt but not of another's.
306. The court said that an instruction revealing the pleas of guilty but directing the
jury to draw from them no inferenc·e as to the remaining defendant's guilt "will prevent
improper inferences that the codefendants' absence has something to say for the remaining defendant's guilt." 519 F.2d at 239. Of course, this is the same instruction that the
court had earlier said might do more harm than good. See note 305 supra.
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of the remaining defendant's guilt. 307 Yet prejudice in that case
is surely not as strong as when the jury has seen the pleading
defendants participate in the trial.
A problem similar to that in Beasley can arise when a codefendant flees the jurisdiction during the trial3°8 or in some way
disrupts the trial. 309 Again, the jury may infer a defendant's guilt
from the actions of a codefendant. The usual judicial response has
been remedial instruction, 310 but it is not clear that juries are
really able to follow these instructions. Understandably, courts
307. See United States v. Vaughn, 546 F.2d 47 (5th Cir. 1977);.United States v.
Hansen, 544 F.2d 778 (5th Cir. 1977). In Hansen, the court criticized the action of the trial
court:
We think this is a bad practice which ought not, and must not, be followed. Trial
Courts have an abundance of resources tci haridle situations where the plea occurs
after the jury has been exposed to the array of the multiple defendants and has
likely heard the reading of an incriminating indictment embellished by the prosecutor's opening statement and perhaps testimony of government witnesses. But there
is no need to advise the jury or its prospective members that some one not in court,
not on trial, and not to be tried, has pleaded guilty. The prejudice to the remaining
parties who are charged with complicity in the acts of the self-confessed guilty
participant is obvious.
544 F.2d at 780.
308. When a defendant flees after trial has begun, the trial may proceed in his
absence. See Too. R. CruM. P. 43. A judge may instruct the jury that flight is evidence of
guilt. See McCORMICK, supra note 238, § 271. Some courts have speculated that the ilight
of one defendant may lead the jury to believe that those who stayed are not guilty. See,
e.g., United States v. Lobo, 516 F.2d 883 (2d Cir.), cert.' denied, 423 U.S. 837 (1975). But
assuming such a favorable inference is surely questionable.
309. A court can take strong measures against a disruptive defendant under Illinois
v. Allen, 365 U.S. 337 (1970), and these measures might reflect unfavorably on joined
defendants. A jury might not punish a defendant who has observed rules of courtroom
behavior, and some courts have noted this as reason to deny a new trial. In Commonwealth
v. Flowers, __ Mass. App. Ct._, 365 N.E.2d 839, cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1977),
Flowers and White were tried for robbery. Flowers elected to represent himself and disrupted the trial on several occasions. On appeal, White contended that Flowers's behavior
had prejudiced him in the eyes of the jury. The court did not agree:
White argues that Flowers' conduct was such as to engender sympathy for the
Commonwealth and was thus harmful to him. The record does not support any such
conclusion. If anything, we are more inclined to the view that if the jury's sympathy
was directed toward anyone, it would have been toward White and his counsel.
__ Mass.App. Ct. at __, 365 N .E.2d at 847. On the other hand, the jury may conclude
that the passive defendant is as bad as the disrup1ive one because they were being tried
together. The jury might also be so annoyed by the disruptions that it will not examine
the evidence with the required detachment.
310. As to fleeing codefendants, see, e.g., People v. Smith, 63 Mich, App. 35, 233
N.W.2d 883 (1975); People v. Shepherd, 63 Mich. App. 316, 234 N.W.2d 502 (1976)
(holding that such an instruction need be given only if requested by the remaining defendant).
As to disruptive codefendants, see, e.g., United States v. Marshall, 458 F.2d 446
(2d Cir. 1972); Commonwealth v. Flowers, __ Mass. App. Ct.-, 366 N.E.2d 839,
cert. denied, 434 U.S. 1077 (1977).
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fear allowing defendants to force a court into granting severance
where it does not want to, 311 and a disruptive defendant might be
misbehaving only for that purpose. Nonetheless, whatever advantages a defendant might gain from severance will probably be lost
because of his behavior, 312 and in any case this danger does not
lessen the prejudice that well-behaved defendants iµight suffer.
Rather than trying to cure prejudice through instruction,
courts should be more forthright in their analysis. They should
acknowledge that a defendant cannot control the actions of his
codefendants. They should recognize that a jury will often infer
guilt from the action of one defendant and then apply that inference to another defendant. As long as defendants are joined,
nothing can repair the prejudice caused by a codefendant pleading guilty, fleeing the jurisdiction, or disrupting a trial. Trial
courts should accept that, in these cases, the efforts to preserve
joinder are often more costly than severance, and they should
order separate trials whenever they would serve the cause of justice.
311. For example, in United States v. Bamberger, 465 F.2d 1119 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 406 U.S. 969 (1972), 413 U.S. 919 (1973), two defendants complained of the
conduct of two other defendants during their joint trial. In the words of the appellate
court,
Young made the following outbursts, inter alia: "white people carry us through this
mock justice. And the judge sitting up there acting all dignified, with his mess;"
"we didn't have nothing when you came to pick us up 400 years ago and put us in
chains. It ain't no different today, you are the same devils, braggarts, braggarts,
braggarts." In open court, he called F.B.I. agent Keogh a liar, and branded F.B.I.
agent Childers an "arch-liar." Bamberger continually interrupted the testimony of
F.B.I. agent Hale, and climaxed this activity by swallowing government exhibit G77.
456 F.2d at 1127.
The appellate court rejected the contention that the misconduct posed a sufficiently grave
risk to the rights of the passive defendants to require the trial court to grant a· mistrial
and severance:
Courtroom outbursts and disruptions, lately occurring with increased frequency,
although regrettable and deplorable, cannot be seized upon in and of themselves
as justifications for retrials. "If such conduct by a co-defendant on trial were held
to require a retrial it might never be possible to conclude a trial involving more than
one defendant; it would provide an easy device for defendants to provoke mistrials
whenever they might choose to do so."
456 F.2d at 1128 (quoting United States v. Aviles, 274 F.2d 179, 193 (2d Cir. 1960)).
312. There is a substantial risk of being held in contempt of court, see, e.g., Illinois
v. Allen, 379 U.S. 337, 344 (1970), and a substantial likelihood that the trial court will
manage a vivid recollection of the events when it is time for sentencing the disruptive
defendant, see, e.g., United States v. Grayson, 438 U.S. 41 (1978) (permissible for trial
judge to increase sentence because of a belief that the defendant committed perjury in
his own defense).
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JV. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUNDAMENTAL CHANGE
Legislation and rules of court have moved steadily toward a
greater reliance on joint trials to dispose of criminal cases in
which more than one actor is allegedly involved. In 1930, the
American Law Institute reported in its Code of Criminal Procedure that statutes in twenty-two jurisdictions granted a criminal
defendant the right to a separate trial in felony cases. 313 In 1968,
the American Bar Asspciation Project on Standards for Criminal
Justice reported that only eight jurisdictions provided by statute
or rule for severance in felony cases upon demand of a defendant. 314 Since then, five of those jurisdictions have provided for
severance in the discretion of the trial court. 315
Only the Uniform Rules of Criminal Procedure, promulgated
in 1974, run counter to this trend. Rule 472 provides in part:
[U]pon motion of the prosecuting attorney or defendant . . . the
court shall sever . . . defendants unless it determines that because
of a significant risk that material evidence which cannot otherwise
be preserved will be lost, the severance would defeat the ends of'
justice.316

In light of the substantial risk of prejudice inherent in joint trials,
the position taken in the Uniform Rules is correct. The uncertain
benefits of joint trials and the mischief they so frequently work
justify a statute or rule of court giving defendants rights to separate trials. While it may be argued that an absolute right to
severance cuts too deeply, the record of trial and appellate courts
313. ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 324, at 239-40 (Proposed Final Draft, 1930).
The Code of Criminal Procedure itself recommended, "When two or more defendants are
jointly charged with any offense, whether felony or misdemeanor, they shall be tried
jointly, unless the court in its discretion on the motion of the prosecuting attorney or any
defendant orders separate trials." ALI, CODE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE§ 312 (Official Draft,
1930).
314. ABA PROJEcr ON MINIMAL STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE, STANDARDS RELATING
TO JolNDER AND SEVERANCE §§ 48-66 (Approved Draft, 1968).
315. GA. CODE ANN. § 27-2101 (1978 Rev.) was amended to make severance discretionary except in capital cases. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 62-1429 (1950) was replaced by KAN, STAT,
ANN. § 22-3204 (1974), making severance discretionary in all cases. MtNN. STAT, ANN, §
631.03 (Supp. 1979) was replaced by MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03, making severance discretionary but creating a presumption of separate trials. Miss. CODE ANN. § 99-15-47 (1972)
was interpreted by rule of court and judicial decision to grant a right of severance only in
capital cases. See Price v. State, 336 So. 2d 1311 (Miss. 1973), NEB. REv. STAT, § 29-2002
(1957) was amended to provide for discretionary severance.
One jurisdiction, Vermont, expanded the right of severance. A statute granted a right
of severance to all persons charged with a felony, other than conspiracy, punishable by
death or more than five years' imprisonment. VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 13, § 6507 (1958). Under
VT. R. CRIM. P. 14, the right to severance was expanded to encompass all felony cases.
316. UNIFORM RULE OF CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 472 (Approved Draft, 1974).
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in administering the discretionary system is so dismal that anything less may be inadequate.
While legislation providing a right of severance is justified,
less radical solutions may be more attainable. One possible remedy is to reverse the "presumption" of the current law that defendants jointly charged should be jointly tried. For example, the
Minnesota rules of court provide in part: ·
When two or more defendants shall be jointly charged with a felony, they shall be tried separately provided, however, upon written motion, the court in the interests of justice and not solely
related to economy of time or expense may order a joint trial for
any two or more said defendants. 317

This rule places the burden of justifying a joint trial upon the
party wishing it, ordinarily the prosecutor. While the phrase "in
the interest of justice" is too vague to be useful, the trial court is
also directed not to order a joint trial for reasons "solely related
to economy of time or expense." These directions require courts
to consider the justifications that do not relate only to efficiency, 318 reasons which usually would not compel a joint trial.
317. MINN. R. CRIM. P. 17.03.
318. See text at notes 43-70 supra. Although the rule, and the statute it superseded
without change in substance, replaced an earlier statute providing an absolute right to a
separate trial in felony cases, the Minnesota court adopted the interpretative policy that
"this state still strongly favors separate trials, and recognizes that they should be the rule
rather than the exception." State v. Duncan, 250 N.W.2d 189, 198 (Minn. 1977). The
court, interpreting the requirement that ordering a joint trial must be "in the interest of
justice and not related to time or economy" emphasized the trauma created by requiring
certain kinds of victims to testify in multiple trials. In State v. Gengler, 294 Minn. 503,
200 N.W.2d 187 (1972), three defendants were convicted of having sexual intercourse with
a child under 14 years of age, and two of those defendants were also convicted of committing sodomy. The court upheld the joint trial order with the comment: "Clearly, it was in
the interests of justice that the victims be spared the ordeal of testifying on three separate
occasions to the terrifying and revolting details of these offenses." 294 Minn. at 504, 200
N.W.2d at 189. Similarly, in State v. Swenson, 301 Minn. 199, 221 N.W.2d 706 (1974),
the court upheld a joint trial order in a robbery case on the ground that four of the five
victims were from 63 to 73 years of age, one of them was nearly blind, and three of them
had heart problems. In State v. Strimling, 265 N.W.2d 423 (Minn. 1978), however, the
court upheld a joint trial order on the less standard ground that many of the state's
witnesses were business associates of the defendants:
Much of the state's case at trial depended on the testimony of several of the defendants' business associates - witnesses who were at best sympathetic toward defendants and at worst openly hostile toward the prosecution. It would be naive to think
that the opportunity for such witnesses to rehearse and compare notes following a
first trial would not affect the state's proof in a second trial.
265 N.W.2d at 432. The Strimling court also relied on a variant of the "overall view"
argument for joint trials, see text at note 55 supra, that could authorize joint trials for
many so-called white-collar crimes:
[I]n a prosecution for a "white-collar" crime where the defendants have acted in
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Properly applied, this rule would reserve joinder for the peculiar
cases in which it is appropriate. 319
Even if courts are reluctant to shift the burden to the prosecution, they can at least relax the requirement that a defendant
show a compelling reason to be severed. Trial courts have uncritically accepted the alleged benefits of joint trials just as they have
unthinkingly ignored both the general impediments joint trials
pose to fair adjudication and the specific prejudices they create
or aggravate. Trial courts should look realistically at the advantages and disadvantages of joint trials. They could require that a
defendant show substantial - not monumental - prejudice from
joinder. The prosecution could then rebut by showing a substantial benefit from joinder. This arrangement of burdens would
eliminate at least some of the injustices of the current presumption in favor of joinder.
Appellate courts, too, must scrutinize severance questions
more closely, respecting appropriate spheres of trial court autonomy but appreciating that the legitimacy of an entire lawsuit is
concert to spin a complex web oflegal and illegal entrepreneurial activity, we think
justice requires that the members of the jury be confronted with both participants
in order to facilitate their fullest comprehension of the alleged wrongdoing and the
accompanying proofs and defenses. We conclude, therefore, that a joint trial was
not only allowable, but also well-suited to the unusual demands of this prosecution.
265 N.W.2d at 432. In each of these cases the Minnesota court held that the facts did not
justify granting a severance to prevent prejudice to the defendants.
319. Ohio provided by statute: "When two or more persons are jointly indicted for a
capital offense, each of such persons shall be tried separately, unless the court orders the
defendants to be tried jointly, upon application by the prosecuting attorney or one or more
of the defendants and for good cause shown." Omo REv. CODE ANN. § 2945.20 (Page 1976),
superseded without change in substance by Omo R. CruM. P. 14. In State v. Abbott, 152
Ohio St. 228, 89 N.E.2d 147 (1949), the Ohio Supreme Court placed the burden of showing
"good cause" under the statute upon the party seeking a joint trial. It interpreted "good
cause" to be
some operative factor not present in every case of joint indictments of defendants
in capital cases. For instance, the additional time and labor required of the state
or court, or the expense to the state, made necessary by separate trials, cannot be
assigned or considered as good cause.
152 Ohio St. at 236, 89 N.E.2d at 151. In State v. Fields, 29 Ohio App. 2d 154,279 N.E.2d
616 (1971), the court of appeals, in applying the Abbott criteria, held that the trial court
did not abuse its discretion by providing a joint trial of capital crimes after a change of
venue had been granted:
Such change of venue required the transportation of witnesses, exhibits, case materials and counsel for considerably greater distances than would otherwise have been
necessary. Duplicatioi'.i of this inconvenience and expense should not be permitted
unless the examination thereof by a joint trial would result in actual prejudice to
the defendants jointly tried.
29 Ohio App. 2d at 160, 279 N.E.2d at 620.
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in question. With an especially critical eye, they must examine
the standard justifications for joint trials that the government
offers to discharge its burden. The prosecution should no longer
be permitted to rest on its presumption.

